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ESCAPING CIRCULARITY: THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND
PROPERTY LAW
JOÃO MARINOTTI*
The Supreme Court’s “reasonable expectation of privacy” test under
the Fourth Amendment has often been criticized as circular, and hence
subjective and unpredictable. The Court is presumed to base its decisions on
society’s expectations of privacy, while society’s expectations of privacy are
themselves presumed to be based on the Court’s judgements. As a solution
to this problem, property law has been repeatedly propounded as an
allegedly independent, autonomous area of law from which the Supreme
Court can glean reasonable expectations of privacy without falling back into
tautological reasoning.
Such an approach presupposes that property law is not itself circular.
If it were, then property would be subject to the very same criticisms that
plague the reasonable expectation of privacy test. The ubiquitous “bundleof-sticks” interpretation of property law, however, is inherently circular.
Therefore, this common realist analysis of property fails to offer a coherent
solution to the Supreme Court’s doctrinal concerns. In spite of this, property
law can nonetheless provide solutions to circularity when viewed through
another lens.
This Article applies the “New Private Law” research framework in the
context of the Fourth Amendment and property law, thereby incorporating
findings from cognitive science, sociology, and complex systems theory
alongside doctrinal private law analyses. The Article demonstrates that an
intensional definition of property, as well as of thinghood and possession,
provides the necessary analytical tools to understand when and how property
law can aid in avoiding circularity. Such a solution, however, would require
that the realist approaches to property law—currently embraced by courts
and legislatures—make way for a more nuanced vision informed by the
growing interdisciplinary approaches to private law.
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INTRODUCTION
The Fourth Amendment protects the “right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures.”1 Through its language, the Amendment presupposes a universe in
which the distinction between the public world and our private spaces is
clear. This distinction, however, has begun to disintegrate as culture and
technology continue to evolve.2 What, then, does the Fourth Amendment
still protect? Does it protect the “airspace” over our homes, where both
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”).
2. See, e.g., Carol A. Sullivan, Going Out on a Limb: Advocating for Enhanced Legal
Protections for Advanced Prosthetic Limbs, 51 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 669, 670 (2018) (“In recent
years . . . technologies have blurred the once clear dichotomy between previously established
conceptions of personhood and property.”); Lauren Bass, Note, The Concealed Cost of
Convenience: Protecting Personal Data Privacy in the Age of Alexa, 30 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 261, 302, 324 (2019) (“Alexa’s [Amazon’s smart assistant] natural-language
processing erases any tactile reminder that one’s data is constantly being collected . . . . [T]he data
collection capabilities of AI have infiltrated the most personal spheres of its users such as the home.
It is only a matter of time before AI dominates other traditionally ‘protected’ spaces such as our
cars, our businesses, and our classrooms.”); J.G. Allen, Property in Digital Coins, 8 EUR. PROP. L.J.
64, 82–84 (2019) (“[D]ocumentary intangibles” such as “negotiable instruments, stock, shares,
policies of insurance, and bills of lading” are “dematerializing before our eyes”).
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police agencies and private companies like Amazon want to fly drones?3
Does it protect our DNA samples or cloned cells as if they were our private
effects?4
One way of answering these questions would be to return to the
“traditional property-based understanding of the Fourth Amendment.”5
Under this approach, the questions above would be answered solely by
considering whether each of these are, indeed, property. Speaking for the
U.S. Supreme Court, Justice Scalia noted that this “property-rights baseline”
is helpful because it “keeps easy cases easy.”6 Justice Thomas has continued
to promote this property baseline because it allegedly also solves an
intractable “problem.”7 The problem is that of circularity, which has been a
criticized element of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence ever since Katz v.
United States8 introduced the reasonable expectation of privacy test in 1967.9
Under the Katz test, the Court is meant to grant Fourth Amendment
protections when society has a reasonable expectation of privacy, but
society’s expectations of privacy may themselves be based on the Court’s
judgements. Mirroring Justices Scalia and Thomas, Justice Kennedy too
concluded that property must therefore be “fundamental ‘in determining the

3. Katrina M. Wyman, The New Essentialism in Property, 9 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 183, 183
(2017); see also Cade Metz, Police Drones Are Starting to Think for Themselves, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
5, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/05/technology/police-drones.html (“Police agencies
from Hawaii to New York have used drones for years . . . [b]ut the latest drone technology . . . has
the power to transform everyday policing . . . . That newfound automation, however, raises civil
liberties concerns, especially as drones gain the power to track vehicles and people automatically.
As the police use more drones, they could collect and store more video of life in the city, which
could remove any expectation of privacy once you leave the home.”).
4. Wyman, supra note 3, at 183–84 (summarizing arguments against the bundle-of-rights
conceptualization of property made by James E. Penner, The Bundle of Rights Picture of Property,
43 UCLA L. REV. 711, 721–22 (1996) and Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Why Restate the
Bundle: The Disintegration of the Restatement of Property, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 681, 683 (2013));
see also Jordan Mason, No Longer Innocent Until Proven Guilty: How Ohio Violates the Fourth
Amendment Through Familial DNA Searches of Felony Arrestees, 69 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 185, 202–
03 (2020) (citing State v. Emerson, 981 N.E.2d 787, 792 (Ohio 2012)) (“[A] defendant [can] not
plausibly assert any expectation of privacy with respect to the scientific analysis of a lawfully seized
item of tangible property, such as a gun or a controlled substance. Although, human blood, with its
unique genetic properties, may initially be quantitatively different from such evidence, once
constitutional concerns have been satisfied, a blood sample is not unlike other tangible property
which can be subject to a battery of scientific tests.”) (alteration in original) (emphasis added).
5. Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 11 (2013).
6. Id.
7. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2245 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
8. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
9. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (noting that the Fourth Amendment protects the
“expectation[s] of privacy . . . that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable’”) (“the Katz
test”).
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presence or absence of the privacy interests protected by [the Fourth]
Amendment.’”10
More recently, property law analyses of the Fourth Amendment have
gained an even stronger footing in the Supreme Court. By appointing three
new textualist-originalist Justices to the Court, former President Trump all
but assured property law’s continued role in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. Justice Gorsuch, for example, has argued “that Katz is
insufficiently founded in the text of the Fourth Amendment because it sets
forth a standard not contained within its language.”11 Instead, Justice
Gorsuch claims “that both the past and future of the Fourth Amendment
support” the idea that “property-based concepts should shape Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence.”12
Thus, regardless of whether one believes that property law should define
Fourth Amendment protections, property law is here to stay and may enjoy a
growing base of support from the Justices in the years to come. Given this
turn toward property-based interpretations of the Fourth Amendment,
however, it is concerning that the Court’s analyses of property law are
frequently “both incomplete and disconcertingly disconnected.”13 As
Thomas Merrill summarized, the Court’s analyses of property law “reinforce
the impression of nine Justices speaking past one another about the meaning
of property.”14

10. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2227 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S.
128, 143–44 n.12)).
11. Chris Machold, Could Justice Gorsuch’s Libertarian Fourth Amendment Be the Future of
Digital Privacy? A Moderate Contracts Approach to Protecting Defendants After Carpenter, 53
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1643, 1657 (2019); see also Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2264 (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting) (“Katz’s problems start with the text and original understanding of the Fourth
Amendment . . . . The Amendment’s protections do not depend on the breach of some abstract
‘expectation of privacy’ whose contours are left to the judicial imagination.”). But cf. Orin Kerr,
Katz as Originalism, 71 DUKE L.J. 1047, 1104 (2022) (“The substance of the Katz inquiry is entirely
consistent with the Fourth Amendment’s text and history.”).
12. Machold, supra note 11, at 1658. It is, however, possible that Gorsuch’s “property model
would be more expansive than the pre-Katz trespass test that the Court rehabilitated in 2012. If that
is the case . . . this framework might closely resemble outcomes under a principled privacy-based
analysis.” Nicholas A. Kahn-Fogel, Property, Privacy, and Justice Gorsuch’s Expansive Fourth
Amendment Originalism, 43 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 425, 429 (2020). This shift towards property
has also been noticed outside the Court. See, e.g., Damon Root, Criminal Justice Divides the
‘Conservative’ Judiciary, REASON (July 2020), https://reason.com/2020/06/13/criminal-justicedivides-the-conservative-judiciary/ (“Gorsuch wanted to scrap those third-party precedents and
have the Court adhere instead to an originalist, property rights-based theory of the Fourth
Amendment.”).
13. Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885, 996
(2000) (discussing specifically the Supreme Court’s analysis of constitutional takings using the
language of property law).
14. Id. at 996–97 (“None of the authors of the key opinions appeared to feel any obligation to
contribute to a cumulative jurisprudence of constitutional property. Rather, the reigning impulse
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What is frequently agreed upon in the Court’s analyses, however, is that
property may be characterized as a “‘bundle of sticks’—a collection of
individual rights.”15 The Justices have also agreed that this bundle is
flexible—that it “can be reshaped in accordance with . . . evolving values and
policy goals.”16 Such descriptions have come to be the “conventional
wisdom” of modern American property law.17 If the property bundle is
simply a moldable policy tool, however, property law can provide us with no
analytical definition—or baseline—to be used as a starting point in
determining whether airspace, cell cultures, or anything else is property, and
consequently whether they are protected by a property-based analysis of the
Fourth Amendment.18
Despite these concerns, many Justices have returned to property law as
the basis of Fourth Amendment analysis. Some have done so in an attempt
to avoid the Katz test entirely through an allegedly more textual propertybased interpretation while others have applied property law concepts within
the Katz test itself.19 Property’s role within the Katz test rests on the Supreme
Court’s insistence that “expectations of privacy must come from outside its
Fourth Amendment precedents” to avoid circular reasoning.20 And because
property law lies outside Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, it is meant to
serve as a solution to the circularity pitfalls of a standalone analysis of Katz.
Given the resurgence of interest in property-based analyses of the
Fourth Amendment, this Article adopts the Justices’ concerns about Fourth
Amendment circularity to then determine whether property law can
coherently address their concerns at all. It does not seek to validate whether

seems to be a desire to advance some personal objective that is the product of value commitments
that remain below the surface.”).
15. Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1937–38 (2019) (Sotomayor,
J., dissenting); see also, e.g., Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1952 (2017) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting); Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 576 U.S. 350, 361–62 (2015); Henderson v. United States,
575 U.S. 622, 626 (2015); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency, 535 U.S.
302, 327 (2002); United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 278–79 (2002).
16. Wyman, supra note 3, at 184.
17. Henry E. Smith, The Persistence of System in Property Law, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 2055, 2059
(2015) (“The most famous legacy of realist nominalism in property law is the bundle of rights,
which eventually was accepted as conventional wisdom.”).
18. Wyman, supra note 3, at 183–84; Penner, supra note 4, at 721 (citing Moore v. Regents of
Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990)). The Fourth Amendment consequences of treating DNA
samples as property (or not) can be seen in Mason, supra note 4.
19. See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2245 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting);
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32–34 (2001); Byrd v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1518, 1526–
27 (2018); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 407–08 (2012).
20. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2245 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S.
128, 144 n.12 (1978)) (emphasis added).
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Katz is indeed circular,21 or whether such circularity is inherently
problematic,22 or even whether property norms can sufficiently protect
privacy rights.23 Each of these assertions has rightly been and will continue
to be the subject of much scholarly debate. This Article, however, for the
sake of argument, adopts the Supreme Court’s articulated concerns over
Fourth Amendment circularity as valid. It does so in an attempt to
demonstrate that even if all of the Court’s views were irrefutably true, the
Court’s currently articulated bundle-of-sticks view of property law cannot be
logically used to address its circularity concerns.
Through this analysis, this Article first demonstrates that while
property-based analyses of the Fourth Amendment are meant to address the
“circularity problem,”24 they may be vulnerable to the very circularity that
property law is meant to avoid. Property law, however, may shield against
circularity when viewed through intensional approaches, including through
the interdisciplinary lens of the New Private Law.25 Accordingly, the core
interconnected principles of property law may provide a non-circular
baseline for defining the “things” for which Fourth Amendment protections
are reasonably expected.26 The Article concludes, however, that before
property can serve as a shield against circularity, the commonly cited
utilitarian bundle-of-sticks conceptualization of property law must make way
for a new intensional definition of property.
21. Matthew B. Kugler & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Myth of Fourth Amendment Circularity,
84 U. CHI. L. REV. 1747 (2017) (arguing that the Fourth Amendment test is not circular). But cf.
Raff Donelson, The Real Problem with Katz Circularity, 65 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 809 (2021) (arguing
that the problem with Katz’s circularity is even more expansive than the traditionally cited
concerns).
22. Michael Abramowicz, Constitutional Circularity, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1, 47 (2001) (noting
that circularity may increase the “danger of law through judicial fiat”). But cf. Wendy Gerwick
Couture, Materiality and a Theory of Legal Circularity, 17 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 453, 453–54 (2015)
(arguing that “courts and scholars should explicitly embrace the legal circularity” in the context of
materiality in securities fraud).
23. Thomas K. Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amendment Protect: Property, Privacy, or
Security?, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 307, 367 (1998) (arguing that the right to exclude, as derived
from property law, is the right defined by the Fourth Amendment). But cf. Janine Young Kim, On
the Broadness of the Fourth Amendment, 74 SMU L. REV. 3, 57 (2021) (arguing that “[a] study of
the Amendment’s history, language, and Supreme Court interpretations shows that its protections
have always been broader in scope [than merely property] and have consistently included at least a
concern for individual privacy”).
24. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2245 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
25. The New Private Law is a research framework that attempts to understand and explain the
structure and function of private law by incorporating interdisciplinary insights from fields
including psychology, economics, and complex systems theory, while not rejecting the central role
of legal concepts, legal reasoning, and doctrine. See generally THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE
NEW PRIVATE LAW (Andrew S. Gold et al. eds., 2021).
26. Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691, 1691 (2012). As
will be explained, however, I do not mean to say that all doctrines of property law should be used
to answer Fourth Amendment questions. See infra Part III.
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The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I dissects modern Fourth
Amendment doctrine and its reliance on concepts of property law. It
uncovers the doctrine’s underlying assumptions about the very foundations
of property and how these assumptions are incompatible with the language
used by the Supreme Court. Part II argues that while the Court uses the
“bundle of rights” metaphor, the bundle approach runs into two main
problems. First, the conceptual bundle-of-rights theory does not map onto
actual juridical practices (i.e., American property law as a whole). Second,
it fails to solve the Court’s circularity problem in the Fourth Amendment.
Part III presents an alternative analysis of property law that can serve as a
solution to circularity. It does so by acknowledging that the very core of
property is not tautological; rather an intensional definition of property, based
on its role as a tool for private ordering, provides a doctrinal anchor. This
intensional definition of property ties property law’s core principles to
perceptual salience, social practice, and shared expectations.
The Article concludes that if Fourth Amendment doctrine is to be
coherent, it cannot simultaneously avoid circularity while continuing to rely
on the bundle-of-rights analysis of property law. Thus, only two options
remain. One is to surrender to circularity as an intractable, benign, or
nonexistent problem while retaining the realist bundle-of-rights. Another
alternative, however—the one explored in Parts III and IV of this Article27—
may be to adopt a more resilient and determinate analysis of property law. If
(i) circularity is indeed a problem for the Court and (ii) a property-based
analysis of the Fourth Amendment is sought, then, the analysis of property
law proposed in this Article would better address the Court’s concerns while
providing clearer answers to Fourth Amendment questions.
I. CIRCULARITY IN THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: PRIVACY OR PROPERTY?
The “basic purpose” of the Fourth Amendment “is to safeguard the
privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by
governmental officials.”28 Historically, the Supreme Court’s analysis of the
Fourth Amendment relied on doctrines of “common-law trespass” in
property law.29 Later recognizing that “the Fourth Amendment protects
people, not places,” the Supreme Court held that “property rights are not the
sole measure of Fourth Amendment violations.”30 Rather, the Fourth

27. See infra Parts III and IV.
28. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2213 (quoting Camara v. Mun. Ct. of City & Cnty. of San
Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967)).
29. Id. (citing United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405, 406 n.3 (2012)).
30. Id. (first quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967); then quoting Soldal v.
Cook Cnty., 506 U.S. 56, 64 (1992)).
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Amendment protects the “expectation[s] of privacy . . . that society is
prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable,’” as laid down in Katz.31
The Court’s shift to a reasonable expectation of privacy test was
severely scrutinized by both academics and several Justices themselves.32
The test is frequently characterized as “doctrinally circular, or tautological”33
and consequently “subjective and unpredictable.”34 Justice Thomas
summarized this critique by observing that “[w]hile this Court is supposed to
base its decisions on society’s expectations of privacy, society’s expectations
of privacy are, in turn, shaped by [the] Court’s decisions.”35 Consequently,
such circularity, especially at the constitutional level, may threaten the
legitimacy of the Court by increasing “the danger of law through judicial
fiat.”36
In response to these critiques, some of the Court’s more textualist
Justices “resuscitated” property law as a potential basis of Fourth
Amendment analysis,37 clarifying that the “Katz reasonable-expectations test
‘has been added to, not substituted for,’ the traditional property-based
understanding of the Fourth Amendment.”38 Since then, the Court’s
reasoning has been fragmented, with each Justice choosing to expand upon
the reasonable expectation of privacy approach, the property law approach,
or both.39 Even when applying the reasonable expectation test, some Justices
believe that “an expectation of privacy becomes ‘reasonable’ only when it is

31. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (the so-called “Katz test”).
32. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001); United States v. Jacobsen, 466
U.S. 109, 123 n.22 (1984); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 427 (Alito, J., concurring);
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2245 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also, e.g., Jeffrey Bellin, Fourth
Amendment Textualism, 118 MICH. L. REV. 233, 251–54 (2019); Nicholas A. Kahn-Fogel, Katz,
Carpenter, and Classical Conservatism, 29 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 95, 95 (2018) (footnote
omitted); Amitai Etzioni, Eight Nails into Katz’s Coffin, 65 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 413, 413–16
(2014); Andrew D. Selbst, Contextual Expectations of Privacy, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 643, 656–62
(2013); Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101, 132–33 (2008).
33. Kahn-Fogel, supra note 32, at 103 (footnote omitted).
34. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.
35. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2245–46 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Truth be told, this Court does
not treat the Katz test as a descriptive inquiry. Although the Katz test is phrased in descriptive terms
about society’s views, this Court treats it like a normative question—whether a particular practice
should be considered a search under the Fourth Amendment.”).
36. Abramowicz, supra note 22, at 47, 53 (“A judge’s own doctrinal preferences may influence
the decision, and constitutional circularity may give judges an opportunity to reach a desired result
that simply would be indefensible given conventional approaches to constitutional interpretation.”).
37. Kahn-Fogel, supra note 32, at 104 (citing United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012)).
38. Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 11 (2013) (quoting Jones, 565 U.S. at 952).
39. In 2013, Justice Scalia’s analysis of the Fourth Amendment cited to Blackstone’s
Commentaries on the Laws of England (1769)’s analysis of “curtilage or homestall” in property
law. Jardines, 569 U.S. at 6–7. But in 2018, “the Court [made] no mention of property law, except
to reject its relevance.” Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2245 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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backed by a right to exclude borrowed from . . . property law.”40 As Justice
Kennedy explained, property law is fundamental in determining privacy
interests protected by the Fourth Amendment because (1) “individuals often
have greater expectations of privacy in things and places that belong to
them;” and (2) the Fourth Amendment may, textually, only protect “a
person’s own ‘houses, papers, and effects.” 41
A. Finding Circularity
Based on the Justices’ analyses described above,42 “Katz did not
abandon reliance on property-based concepts” and property law is here to
stay.43 As noted, this Article does not seek to determine whether it is
normatively desirable for property law to delineate Fourth Amendment
protections. Rather, it aims to determine whether property law can fulfill the
role it has been given, as a solution to the Fourth Amendment’s criticized
circularity. Of particular relevance to this goal is the Court’s rationale for
referring to property law in the post-Katz era. Justice Thomas summarized
that “[t]o address this circularity problem, the Court has insisted that
expectations of privacy must come from outside its Fourth Amendment
precedents.”44 In other words, the Court saw it necessary to adopt an
independent, autonomous reference point. This reference point could be
“tethered” either to “concepts of real or personal property law or to

40. Kahn-Fogel, supra note 32, at 133 (emphasis added).
41. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2227 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“The concept of reasonable
expectations of privacy, first announced in [Katz], sought to look beyond the ‘arcane distinctions
developed in property . . . ’ in evaluating whether a person has a sufficient connection to the thing
or place searched to assert Fourth Amendment interests in it. Yet ‘property concepts’ are,
nonetheless, fundamental ‘in determining the presence or absence of the privacy interests protected
by that Amendment.’” (citations omitted)).
42. That is not to say that all Justices agree. The majority in Jones read Justice Alito’s
concurrence as arguing that Katz should now be the “exclusive test.” United States v. Jones, 565
U.S. 400, 411 (2012). Justice Alito’s Jones concurrence, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and
Kagan, argued that “the majority is hard pressed to find support in post-Katz cases for its [property]
trespass-based theory” of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 424 (Alito, J., concurring).
43. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2227–28 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“The Court in Katz analogized
the phone booth used in that case to a friend’s apartment, a taxicab, and a hotel room. So when the
defendant ‘shu[t] the door behind him’ and ‘pa[id] the toll,’ he had a temporary interest in the space
and a legitimate expectation that others would not intrude, much like the interest a hotel guest has
in a hotel room, or an overnight guest has in a host’s home. The Government intruded on that space
when it attached a listening device to the phone booth.” (citations omitted)); see, e.g., Byrd v. United
States, 138 S. Ct. 1518, 1527, 1529 (2018) (“Reference to property concepts . . . aids the Court in
assessing the precise [Fourth Amendment] question here: Does a driver of a rental car have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the car when he or she is not listed as an authorized driver on
the rental agreement? . . . The central inquiry at this point turns on the concept of lawful
possession . . . .”).
44. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2245 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S.
128, 144 n.12 (1978)).
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understandings that are recognized and permitted by society” to the extent
that these are truly independent from the Court’s Fourth Amendment
precedents.45
But is the problem of circularity truly addressed by merely looking
“outside . . . Fourth Amendment precedents”?46
Justice Blackmun’s
Orwellian hypothetical demonstrates that it is not: “[I]f the Government were
suddenly to announce on nationwide television that all homes henceforth
would be subject to warrantless entry, individuals thereafter might not in fact
entertain any actual expectation of privacy regarding their homes, papers, and
effects.”47
Note that in this scenario there is no Fourth Amendment precedent. The
government, through a widespread television campaign, intentionally and
successfully lowers society’s expectations of privacy, which, under an
application of the Katz test, lowers society’s Fourth Amendment protections.
It is of particular relevance that the contents of the television campaign do
not have to be true at the time of the campaign; much like a self-fulfilling
prophecy, the campaign’s existence and success renders its contents true. If
the only problematic version of circularity stemmed from Fourth Amendment
precedents, this television campaign would be a legitimate government
move. The government could “deny privacy just by letting people know in
advance not to expect any” through any other means.48
The problem of circularity and its resulting lack of legitimacy, however,
would nonetheless be present. Justice Thomas recognized this issue when
describing the “circularity problem” while citing to Justice Blackmun’s
dystopian hypothetical.49 It is reliance on government action, not merely
Fourth Amendment precedent, that engenders the problem of circularity.50
45. Id. at 2227 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); id. at 2245 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Rakas,
439 U.S. at 144 n.12 (1978)). Note that some empirical work has demonstrated that, at least in the
short term, societal expectations of privacy are not easily changed directly by Supreme Court
precedent. See, e.g., Kugler & Strahilevitz, supra note 21. But notably, even in such work, the
authors do not evaluate the validity of circularity over an “extended period.” Id. at 1758. This
work, however, may not be relevant to the circularity problem as the Supreme Court “does not treat
the Katz test as a descriptive inquiry . . . this Court treats it like a normative question—whether a
particular practice should be considered a search under the Fourth Amendment.” Carpenter, 138
S. Ct. at 2246 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
46. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2245 (citing Rakas, 439 U.S. at 144 n.12) (emphasis added).
47. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 n.5 (1979).
48. Erwin Chemerinsky, Rediscovering Brandeis’s Right to Privacy, 45 BRANDEIS L.J. 643,
650 (2006).
49. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2245 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
50. It is also known that changes in technology may trigger a spiral in which expectations of
privacy are extinguished in return for consumer services and convenience. This is also a form of
circularity: social expectations of privacy are lowered as new technologies become more and more
intrusive while even newer technologies are developed to take advantage of these lowered
expectations of privacy. Although this problem is significant and poses its own threats to privacy,
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An alternative version of Justice Blackmun’s scenario demonstrates this
further. Imagine that the government suddenly clarified on nationwide
television that property rights do not include the right to exclude police
officers (i.e., that right-to-exclude stick in the bundle were now slightly
smaller and no longer allowed for trespass suits against police officers). In
this scenario, a property-based analysis of Fourth Amendment protections
would be just as circular as the Katz test.51 A malevolent state court, for
example, could issue property law precedents to yield the desired Fourth
Amendment conclusion, thus changing Fourth Amendment protections
through the very “judicial fiat” that property law was meant to prevent.52
Even if the property bundle were legislatively manipulated for Fourth
Amendment purposes, the circularity engendered by government action
would be equally problematic, as explained by Justice Gorsuch.53
For the purposes of this Article, the takeaway of this hypothetical does
not depend on such drastic and perhaps unrealistic changes to existing
property law. Rather, each and every time a court encounters a property law
question of first impression, the results could have property-based Fourth
Amendment consequences. The commonly taught case of Moore v. Regents
of the University of California54 may serve as a great example. In this case,
John Moore underwent medical procedures during which cells were extracted
from his body. Researchers used “his cells in potentially lucrative medical
research without his permission.”55 Moore sued for conversion, alleging that
his property interests in the cells were violated. The Supreme Court of
it is outside the scope of this Article. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has already begun to address
this additional threat. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 427 (2012) (“[T]he Katz test
rests on the assumption that this hypothetical reasonable person has a well-developed and stable set
of privacy expectations. But technology can change those expectations.”); United States v.
Gonzalez, 300 F.3d 1048, 1054 (9th Cir. 2002).
51. That such action could very likely be a judicial, legislative, or regulatory taking under the
Fifth Amendment will come into play later. See infra notes 202–204 and accompanying text. But
cf. Brian Angelo Lee, Emergency Takings, 114 MICH. L. REV. 391, 393, 399 (2015) (noting that
“[p]olice activities to apprehend criminal suspects are also a fertile source of emergency-takings
claims. For example, suits have sought compensation for the destruction of windows (and other
property damage)” but have run into the so-called “noncompensation principle.”). Nonetheless, Lee
concludes that the noncompensation principle is less historically and doctrinally sound than
previously argued.
52. Abramowicz, supra note 22, at 47, 53 (“[C]onstitutional circularity may give judges an
opportunity to reach a desired result that simply would be indefensible given conventional
approaches to constitutional interpretation.”).
53. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2270–71 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“Legislatures cannot pass
laws declaring your house or papers to be your property except to the extent the police wish to
search them without cause [because] . . . ‘we must assur[e] preservation of that degree of privacy
against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.’” (quoting Jones, 565
U.S. at 406)).
54. 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
55. Id. at 480.
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California, in a divided decision, ultimately concluded that no property right
existed, so no conversion could have occurred. The majority’s property law
logic, or lack thereof,56 led to the situation in which Moore lacked property
rights over cells containing his own DNA. If “an expectation of privacy
becomes ‘reasonable’ only when it is backed by a right to exclude borrowed
from . . . property law,”57 Moore would have no reasonable privacy interests
in his own DNA. While Moore may not have been malevolently decided for
this purpose, it is possible to see the implications of such property law
precedents on Fourth Amendment protections.
The Supreme Court has not addressed this concern. Without saying so,
the Court’s rulings assume that property law is shielded from accidental
Fourth Amendment consequences or even malicious Fourth Amendmentinformed manipulation because “society’s traditional commitments are often
reflected in positive property law, be it statutory law or common law
principles.”58 Thus, in this view, property law would not be vulnerable to
intentional government manipulation because of its tight interdependence
with society’s traditional commitments, understandings, and expectations.
Property law would thereby serve to shield Fourth Amendment reasoning
from the dangers of circularity.
This assumption, which may continue to shape the core of Fourth
Amendment doctrine, however, has not been sufficiently tested by courts or
academics. In this Article, I attempt to examine the validity and doctrinal
consequences of this assumption by turning to the very foundations of
property law. By analyzing the academic and judicial understandings of
property, I demonstrate that an unconstrained, realist bundle-of-rights
(“BOR”) analysis of property law is indeed circular and subject to the same
criticisms as the Katz test. This, however, does not mean that property law
is intractably circular. The concept of legal thinghood, espoused by leading
property scholars, brings the necessary directionality and autonomy required
not only for property law to serve as a means for private ordering but also for
breaking tautological reasoning. I demonstrate that this frequently
undertheorized conceptualization of property law can serve as a potential
solution to doctrinal circularity. This solution, however, requires that judges
and legislators move beyond the realist BOR approach to property law.

56. Penner, supra note 4, at 718 (“[W]hat is conspicuously absent from the court’s reasoning is
any focused discussion about what constitutes a right to property.”).
57. Kahn-Fogel, supra note 32, at 133 (emphasis added).
58. Id. A more pessimistic reading of the Court’s analyses is that it may feel “no obligation to
reconcile its statements about constitutional meaning [of property] made in closely related
contexts.” Merrill, supra note 13, at 998. If true, “[a]ll that will be left . . . is to pick the precedents
you like, ignore the ones you don’t, and hope for five votes.” Id. at 999.
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B. Defining Circularity
Before diving into how property may or may not address circularity, we
must first define circularity itself.59 To do so, let us stay on the Supreme
Court’s reasonable expectation of privacy test. If the Court bases “whether
someone has a reasonable expectation of privacy on whether the court cases
say he or she does,” the Court’s decision only looks to how it has answered
the very same question in the past;60 it is an analytical closed loop. Matthew
Kugler and Lior Jacob Strahilevitz have called this type of reasoning
“doctrinal circularity.”61 The Court, in an attempt to solve the problem of
doctrinal circularity, has clarified that it looks not only to its own precedent,
but to “understandings that are recognized and permitted by society” as
well.62 Many fear, however, that these “understandings” are themselves
“determined by legal pronouncements.”63 This is termed “attitudinal
circularity,”64 which is also a closed loop but now with two steps: “[T]he
content of the doctrine would still depend on the content of the doctrine, just
with the additional step of popular expectations being influenced by, and in
turn influencing, doctrine.”65
Analytically, both doctrinal circularity and attitudinal circularity can be
seen as versions of infinite recursion––infinite loops of reasoning that do not
rely on any external justification. This recursion would give the government,
namely through judges, the power to define the boundaries of rights from
scratch. By visualizing doctrinal circularity as a recursive question (or
recursive function), it is possible to see the problem in another light. For the
sake of illustration, imagine that the Court’s reasonableness analysis is
represented by question Q. The Court’s reasoning is doctrinally circular
when the Court answers Q by asking the very same question Q. This is
known as direct recursion.66
In the case of attitudinal circularity, two separate questions (or
functions) when applied together also lead to an infinite loop. The first,

59. Wendy Gerwick Couture, Materiality and a Theory of Legal Circularity, 17 U. PA. J. BUS.
L. 453, 453 (2014) (“A legal doctrine is potentially circular if: (1) the legal doctrine incorporates
the behavior or attitude of a population or person, either hypothetical or real; and (2) the subject
population or person either would (if hypothetical) or does (if real) consider prior precedent
interpreting the legal doctrine when choosing said behavior or when adopting said attitude.”).
60. Kugler & Strahilevitz, supra note 21, at 1752.
61. Id. at 1753.
62. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2245 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 144 n.12 (1978)).
63. Kugler & Strahilevitz, supra note 21, at 1753 (citing Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 n.12).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Mariyana Raykova & Petya Asenova, System of Tasks on Recursion, 15 COMP. SCI. &
EDUC. COMP. SCI. 62, 64 (2019) (“Direct recursion is when a function calls itself.”).
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question Q, still refers to the question of whether an expectation of privacy
is reasonable according to the Court. The second, question S, asks whether
society believes an expectation of privacy is reasonable. With these questions
defined, it is possible to see how attitudinal circularity leads to another
infinite loop of reasoning: To answer question Q, the Court asks question S.
But to answer question S, the Court must first answer question Q. This twostep loop found in attitudinal circularity is known as indirect recursion.67
In both doctrinal and attitudinal circularity, infinite recursion occurs
because to answer whether an expectation of privacy is reasonable, we need
to already know the answer to whether the Court believes the expectation is
reasonable. Notably, though, doctrinal and attitudinal circularity are just
two types of infinite recursion. There are many other ways in which
infinite recursion can sneak its way into judicial analyses. If any of the
intermediate steps in the Court’s reasoning suffers from circular logic, the
ultimate conclusion of the legal analysis will nonetheless “be determined by
legal pronouncements.”68
For the sake of argument, let us assume that the Court only looks at
property law in determining Fourth Amendment protections: To answer
question Q, the Court asks whether a property interest exists, which is called
question P. What happens, though, if property law were itself doctrinally
circular (in other words, if to answer question P we must first answer question
P). In realist terms, this would mean that property interests exist only when
the courts say they do. The property-based Fourth Amendment protections
would again return to an infinite loop. This time, however, the loop would
be in the definition of property rights: To answer question Q, the Court asks
question P. But to answer question P, the Court must first answer question
P. In this two-step analysis, no external justifications would be cited in
answering question P, which means no external justification would be
necessary to determine the answer to question Q. Thus, it is crucial to
determine whether property rights themselves are circular to determine
whether they can provide a solution to the Fourth Amendment’s circularity
problem.
II. FOUNDATIONS OF THE BUNDLE OF RIGHTS
Prior to the twentieth century, much of property law was conceptualized
through the lens of natural law. As Merrill summarized, the view “that all
individuals are endowed with rights that roughly correspond to those

67. Id. (“Indirect recursion is when a function calls another function and that function calls the
calling function.”).
68. Kugler & Strahilevitz, supra note 21, at 1753.
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protected by private law, was ascendant.”69 In the twentieth century,
however, “various schools of thought derived from utilitarianism . . . denied
the existence of natural rights, and . . . assimilated both private and public
rights to the same general criterion of aggregate welfare analysis.”70 Such
proposals led to the conceptualization of property law as inherently vacuous:
“‘[P]roperty’ is just a word that means nothing until we spell out—using
different words—exactly what we are talking about in any given context.”71
This view has been described as the bundle-of-sticks72 or bundle-of-rights73
view of property law. As demonstrated by Justice Sotomayor, this view is
also prevalent among judges and Justices: “A common idiom describes
property as a ‘bundle of sticks’—a collection of individual rights which, in
certain combinations, constitute property.”74
Crucially, as Henry Smith and Thomas Merrill have noted, this BOR
perspective of property law also “implies that one can add to or subtract from
the bundle more or less without limit, and still talk about the bundle as
property.”75 Specifically, in the American context, it is “state law” that
“determines . . . which sticks are in a person’s bundle.”76 Under this view,
states and, by extension, state judges, are those who may “add to or subtract
from”77 the property bundle in an attempt to increase “aggregate welfare.”78
Given this metaphor promulgated by the Supreme Court,79 can property law
serve as a solution to Fourth Amendment circularity? The BOR
conceptualization of property cannot.

69. Thomas W. Merrill, Private and Public Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE NEW
PRIVATE LAW, supra note 25, at 575, 575.
70. Id.
71. THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 17 (3rd
ed. 2017).
72. United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 291 (2002) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
73. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1952 (2017) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
74. Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1937–38 (2019) (Sotomayor,
J., dissenting) (quoting Craft, 535 U.S. at 278) (noting that “[r]ights to exclude and to use are two
of the most crucial sticks in the bundle”).
75. MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 71.
76. Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp., 139 S. Ct. at 1937–38 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (noting
that “defining property . . . is a state-law exercise”); see also Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,
577 (1972) (“Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are
created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an
independent source such as state law . . . .”).
77. MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 71.
78. Merrill, supra note 69.
79. See, for example, Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion in Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 576
U.S. 350, 361 (2015); Justice Kagan’s majority opinion in Henderson v. United States, 135 S. Ct.
1780, 1784 (2015); Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 673 (1999); Justice Ginsberg’s majority opinion
in Babbitt v. Youpee, 519 U.S. 234, 242 (1997).
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Without private law constraints on the power of the government (i.e.,
the power of legislators, judges, or executives) to change the contents of the
property bundle, we are left in the same circular situation. A person would
only have “a reasonable expectation of privacy when the courts decide to
protect it.”80 And a person would only have a property interest when the
courts decide to protect that.81 The good news is that the bundle metaphor is
neither the only way to define property nor is it observed literally by the
courts, despite the linguistic metaphor commonly used. To understand how
the bundle metaphor fails in these ways, its history and theoretical
conceptualizations are of crucial importance.
A. Property Law as a Bundle
In the BOR perspective of property law, “property is composed of
discrete rights, such as ‘a right of exclusion, a right of use, a right of
possession, and a right of alienation.’”82 Each state controls and
“determines . . . which sticks are in a person’s bundle.”83 More precisely, “it
is generally agreed that state property law—and typically, the judge-made
common law of the state—define the range of interests that qualify for
constitutional protection.”84 This perspective––that law may pick, choose, or
rearrange sticks in the bundle––seems to be validated by the Supreme Court.
As the Court noted:
[T]he property owner necessarily expects the uses of his property
to be restricted . . . by . . . the State in legitimate exercise of its
police powers . . . . And in the case of personal property, by reason
of the State’s traditionally high degree of control over commercial
dealings, he ought to be aware of the possibility that new regulation
might even render his property economically worthless . . . .85
But that is not where the story ends. The Supreme Court in its Fifth
Amendment jurisprudence notes that states do not have unlimited ability to
80. Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the
Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 808 (2003).
81. Id.
82. Wyman, supra note 3, at 188.
83. Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1937–38 (2019) (Sotomayor,
J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 278 (2002)).
84. Maureen E. Brady, Property’s Ceiling: State Courts and the Expansion of Takings Clause
Property, 102 VA. L. REV. 1167, 1168 (2016) (emphasis added).
85. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027–28 (1992) (emphasis added). State
property and nuisance laws are cited as examples. Id. at 1029 (“Any limitation so severe cannot be
newly legislated or decreed (without compensation), but must inhere . . . in the restrictions that
background principles of the State’s law of property and nuisance already place upon land
ownership. A law or decree with such an effect must . . . do no more than duplicate the result that
could have been achieved in the courts—by adjacent landowners (or other uniquely affected
persons) under the State’s law of private [or public] nuisance.” (emphasis added)).
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tinker with the contents of the property bundle. Justice Kennedy, writing for
the Supreme Court in Murr v. Wisconsin,86 noted that “[a]lthough property
interests have their foundations in state law . . . States do not have the
unfettered authority to ‘shape and define property rights.’”87 Many state
courts themselves have agreed. The Supreme Court of Texas, for example,
noted that property rights are “not derived from the legislature” and may in
fact “preexist[] even constitutions.”88
A literal conceptual application of the BOR theory of property—in
which “one can add to or subtract from the bundle more or less without
limit”—does not seem to have sufficient explanatory power in these cases.89
As the law stands, “[s]tates do not have the unfettered authority to ‘shape’”
the bundle.90 But where does this limitation on the states’ authority come
from? In the alternative, who does have the authority to define the content
of property rights? This question is not just a philosophical puzzle or simply
a matter of legal theory. Rather, the answer demonstrates how an
interdisciplinary analysis of private law may help solve the problem of
doctrinal circularity.
To adequately address these questions, it is first necessary to fully
understand (a) what the BOR picture can and cannot accomplish in legal
doctrine and theory and (b) whether its conceptualizations of property law
sufficiently explain American property law in practice. To do so, I begin by
providing a very abridged history of BOR and the legal-philosophical
momentum behind it.
The intellectual history of the bundle-of-rights conceptualization of
property begins with Wesley Hohfeld’s theory of jural relations.91 According
86. 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017).
87. Id. at 1944–45 (2017) (quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 626–27 (2001))
(mentioning “investment-backed expectations” as well (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New
York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978))).
88. Harris Cnty. Flood Control Dist. v. Kerr, 499 S.W.3d 793, 804 (Tex. 2016) (alterations in
original) (“Locke deemed the preservation of property rights ‘[t]he great and chief end’ of
government, a view we echoed almost 300 years later, calling it ‘one of the most important purposes
of government.’ Individual property rights are ‘a foundational liberty, not a contingent privilege.’”
(alteration in original) (footnotes omitted)).
89. MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 71.
90. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1944–45 (quoting Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 626).
91. See Penner, supra note 4, at 712 (citing WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL
LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING AND OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS 67 (Walter
Wheeler Cook ed., 1923)). Even though Hohfeld “did not originate the metaphor or even use the
term ‘bundle of rights,’ property scholars assert that his unpacking of legal rights into component
jural correlatives and opposites provided both the ‘intellectual justification’ and the ‘analytic
vocabulary’ for the bundle-of-rights conception.” Jane B. Baron, Rescuing the Bundle-of-Rights
Metaphor in Property Law, 82 U. CIN. L. REV. 57, 62 (2013) (footnotes omitted) (first quoting
Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163, 1191 (1999); then
quoting Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and
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to Hohfeld, “any right in rem should be regarded as a myriad of personal
rights between individuals.”92 Ownership of a car, in this view, is not “a legal
relation between me and a thing . . . but [i]s a series of rights I hold against
all others, each of whom has a correlative duty not to interfere with my
ownership of the car, by damaging it, or stealing it, and so on.”93 Ownership,
then, would be a bundle—rather than a unified concept—for three reasons.
First, ownership would comprise the “bundle of rights the owner holds
against many others.”94 Second, “the substance of the property right itself is
subject to fractionation” such that land may be divided, easements granted,
licenses given, etc.95 And third, the sticks in the bundle are not all of the
same quality: “Hohfeld splinters a property right into a bundle of ‘rights’ of
various kinds, including liberties, claim-rights, powers, and immunities.”96
An important consequence of this view, however, is that “every stick [could]
be evaluated in isolation and sticks [could] be added or subtracted at will,
with the meaningless label ‘property’ stuck on as an afterthought.”97
With this analytical infrastructure in place, BOR’s path to dominance
and stature as “conventional wisdom” was assured by the rise of American
Legal Realism.98 While scholars disagree on whether the Realists (a) merely
“popularized” and “embraced” or (b) “co-opted” and “appropriated”
Hohfeld’s framework,99 it is accepted that the “Realists’ reliance on an
Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 365 (2001); and then quoting STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY
OF PROPERTY 18 (1990)).
92. Penner, supra note 4, at 712.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. (citing HOHFELD, supra note 91, at 96).
97. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Architecture of Property, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON PRIVATE LAW THEORY 136 (Hanoch Dagan & Benjamin C. Zipursky eds., 2020).
In the essentialist view, on the other hand, property’s inherent architecture is critical to its form and
function. Id. at 154 (“[T]he architectural theory . . . highlights how property achieves its objectives
(or does not) in a world of complex interaction. It is the complexity of the world and the interactions
that the law has to manage which give property law and institutions many of their characteristic
contours, including their design principles and their inherent dynamism.”).
98. See Smith, supra note 17, at 2056. “The most famous legacy of realist nominalism in
property law is the bundle of rights, which eventually was accepted as conventional wisdom.” Id.
at 2059; see also Baron, supra note 91, at 63. BOR’s ascendance was also aided by the antiregulatory political climate of the late nineteeth century. STUART BANNER, AMERICAN PROPERTY:
A HISTORY OF HOW, WHY, AND WHAT WE OWN 71–72 (2011) (“In the late nineteenth century
the . . . bundle of rights was a distinctly antiregulatory idea . . . justifying constitutional doctrines
that would limit the power of legislatures to regulate in ways that would reduce the value of
property. . . . [BOR] had been in the air for some time, but before the late nineteenth century there
had never been any particularly pressing reason to espouse it.”).
99. Baron, supra note 91, at 63 (first quoting GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY &
PROPRIETY 319 (1997); then quoting Thomas W. Merrill, The Property Prism, 8 ECON J. WATCH
247, 248 (2011); and then quoting Eric R. Claeys, Property 101: Is Property a Thing or a Bundle?,
32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 617, 635–36 (2009)).
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extreme version of the bundle of rights, under which no baselines are
privileged and bundles are plastic in the hands of courts and legislatures, has
become a sort of conventional baseline itself for property theorists.”100 Once
popularized, Hohfeld’s analytical framework was complemented by A.M.
Honoré’s “list of the ‘incidents’ of ownership . . . which outlines in some
detail the right to possess, the right to use . . . and so on.”101 Such incidents
noted which bundles of which rights would be deemed property. Ultimately,
the historical foundations of BOR have come to stand for “the thesis that
property constitutes a legal complex of various normative relations, not
simply rights.”102 The Realists’ largely accomplished goal “to remove the
sanctity that had traditionally attached to the rights of property” was captured
in Thomas Grey’s famous characterization:
In the English-speaking countries today, the conception of property
held by the specialist (the lawyer or economist) is quite different
from that held by the ordinary person. Most people, including most
specialists in their unprofessional moments, conceive of property
as things that are owned by persons. To own property is to have
exclusive control of something—to be able to use it as one wishes,
to sell it, give it away, leave it idle, or destroy it. . . .
By contrast, the theory of property rights held by the modern
specialist [lawyer] tends both to dissolve the notion of ownership
and to eliminate any necessary connection between property rights
and things. Consider ownership first. The specialist fragments the
robust unitary conception of ownership into a more shadowy
“bundle of rights.”103
Grey’s educated lawyer rejects the singular idea of ownership and
adopts what James Penner has summarized as the “Hohfeld-Honoré
Synthesis”: a “tripartite structure of title.”104 First, title contains “the
possessory right, namely the right to immediate, exclusive possession.”105
Second, the title also contains “two powers that go with title, namely the
power to license others to enter into or take possession whilst retaining title,”
and finally “the power to dispose of one’s title, by grant of a lesser title or

100. Thomas Merrill & Henry Edward Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1849, 1869 (2007). In fact, this “underlying conception of property as a bundle of rights was
given a decisive boost by the ALI’s endorsement [in the first Restatement of Property], and quickly
became a kind of American orthodoxy.” Merrill & Smith, supra note 4, at 706.
101. Penner, supra note 4, at 712–13 (citing A.M. Honoré, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN
JURISPRUDENCE 107, 112–24 (A.G. Guest ed., 1961)).
102. Id. at 713.
103. Smith, supra note 17, at 2062–63 (citing Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property,
in PROPERTY: NOMOS XXII 69, 69 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980)).
104. J.E. PENNER, PROPERTY RIGHTS: A RE-EXAMINATION 6 n.11 (2020).
105. Id. at 13.
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outright transfer.”106 Notably, under Grey’s conceptualization, each of these
three strands of the bundle “can be put together or pulled apart at will, such
that any configuration is, more or less, a realization of our concept of property
or ownership.”107
In more recent work, Penner noted that these foundational ideas have
led to two conceptually distinct but mutually reinforcing theses. First, “we
can apply the concept of property to particular rights or bundles of rights
pretty much as we wish.”108 Second, “the reality of the legal relations which
fall under the rubric of property are a battery . . . of Hohfeldian jural
relations.”109 Under these theses, complex property rights, such as “A’s fee
simple title to Blackacre, have no genuine or real normative force within the
legal system.”110 Rather, “[l]egal normativity lies in, and only in, the
normative force of the [individual] Hohfeldian jural relations themselves,
taken one by one.”111 Together, both theses would not only mean that
property is conceptually vapid, but also that each stick in the bundle is
completely “in the hands of courts and legislatures.”112
In fact, “the main lesson of the bundle of rights picture of property is
that property is a collection of interests and property law is a collection of
individual policy-driven rules.”113 Highlighting the state’s power to create,
destroy, or separate any individual stick in the property bundle, Thomas Ross
notes that the “metaphorical conception” of BOR emphasizes the
“separation” from a singular idea of ownership into individual, severable, and
manipulable sticks:
Within both the Hohfeldian abstraction and the metaphorical
conception, my legally recognized right, for example, to lease my
home is distinguishable from my other rights. But within the
metaphorical conception if the state changes or takes away this
particular right, all other rights are presumptively left intact and
unaffected. To take one stick out of the bundle leaves the
remaining sticks undisturbed.114
The separability of fully detachable sticks “would make reform easy:
one simply has to maximize the contribution of each stick in order to

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 1.
Id. at 2.
Id.
Id.
Merrill & Smith, supra note 100, at 1869.
Merrill & Smith, supra note 4, at 707.
Thomas Ross, Metaphor and Paradox, 23 GA. L. REV. 1053, 1061–62 (1989).
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maximize the fitness of the whole bundle.”115 This is why those who seek
property reform, including the Realists, promulgate the BOR
conceptualization. Not only would this metaphor allow such tinkering, but
the “various schools of thought derived from utilitarianism” in the twentieth
and twenty-first centuries, including embodiments of the law and economics
movement, would normatively require that judges and legislatures tinker
away in the hope of increasing aggregate welfare.116
If BOR is conceptually embraced beyond its mere language, property
law is circular: Property rights would be defined as those that judges decide
to protect, whether due to common law or statute. Although this point will
be fleshed out below, BOR’s history already demonstrates how its vision of
property cannot serve as a solution to Fourth Amendment circularity.
Unfortunately, such a view that “property rights are arbitrary
assemblages of rights that the state creates for its own instrumental purposes,
and which it can undo almost at will for the same instrumental ends” aligns
with what Richard Epstein considers the widespread, but nonetheless
erroneous, modern perspective of many governments.117 Before diving into
such deontological critiques of, and alternatives to BOR, it is also important
to explore the bundle metaphor further to pinpoint where circularity is found
and whether its conceptual entailments even map onto American property
law in the first place.
B. The Bundle’s Struggles
Although I do not attempt to provide an exhaustive legal or
philosophical analysis of BOR, the following short two-part discussion
115. Henry E. Smith, Systems Theory: Emergent Private Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
This idea has even led to computational models
of optimizing property law. See Lee Alston & Bernardo Mueller, Towards a More Evolutionary
Theory of Property Rights, 100 IOWA L. REV. 2255, 2259 (2015) (“More specifically,
we . . . portray the evolution of property rights as a search problem over a design space of all
possible bundles of property rights. . . . Property rights with independent sticks will tend to have
smooth, single-peaked (Mount Fuji) landscapes, which are easily searched and thus tend to yield
optimal designs.”); see also Henry E. Smith, Complexity and the Cathedral: Making Law and
Economics More Calabresian, 48 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 43, 51 (2019) (stating that in BOR, “[e]ach
time we make a positive change we need not worry about it making anything worse”).
116. Merrill, supra note 69.
117. Jeremy Waldron, To Bestow Stability upon Possession: Hume’s Alternative to Locke, in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAW 1, 1 (James Penner & Henry E. Smith eds.,
2013) (quoting RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, DESIGN FOR LIBERTY: PRIVATE PROPERTY, PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION, AND THE RULE OF LAW 63 (2011)). Notably, though, Epstein has been a
proponent of BOR. His conceptualization, however, is not that BOR yields a malleable idea of
property. Rather, in his conceptualization, BOR contains “a strong and internally coherent notion
of what property is,” allowing a clear stick-by-stick accounting of “the state’s power of eminent
domain.” Richard A. Epstein, Bundle-of-Rights Theory as a Bulwark Against Statist Conceptions
of Private Property, 8 ECON J. WATCH 223, 226 (2011).
THE NEW PRIVATE LAW, supra note 25, at 143, 148.
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should sufficiently demonstrate this conceptualization’s potential
weaknesses as the foundation of property law. First, I return to Penner’s
“Hohfeld-Honoré Synthesis,” the “tripartite structure of title.”118 Under this
conceptualization of BOR, title to property contains the right to immediate
exclusive possession, the power to license, dispose, or grant lesser title, each
of which is a fully independent stick in the bundle that may be disaggregated
at will.119 Notice, however, that when the tripartite structure is disaggregated,
legal confusion may be inevitable. What sub-bundles, if any, constitute
ownership? In other words, Penner asks what property and ownership mean
when:
A has the right to exclude, but
B has the power to license,120 and
C the power to transfer.121
For example, while a “security guard may have the legal powers to
exclude”—one of the rights in the tripartite bundle—the guard is not “an
owner of what he is guarding.”122 Similarly, a trustee “has the right of
immediate exclusive possession of the trust assets”—another right in the
tripartite bundle—but “he has no liberty to use the property for his own
benefit,” and is therefore not the true owner either.123 Who is the property
owner if no stick or sticks “are privileged” in the BOR conceptualization of
property?124 In this scenario, the concept of property might as well not even
exist.
This conclusion, however, ignores the fact that “some uses that A would
wish to make could be thwarted by B, but B’s exercise of this power, except
insofar as he licenses himself singly or with others, would be of no benefit to
B per se. The same could be said of C’s power to transfer.”125 In other words,
BOR leaves us with no legal methodology to distinguish between the legal
positions of A, B, and C. We are left without a way to determine who among
A, B, or C would be able to lawfully enforce their rights or use their powers.
Additionally, BOR’s conclusion that A, B, and C are all owners—or that
none of them are owners (because such terminology is meaningless)—does
not align with the traditional perspective of property. The right to exclude
without the liberty to use or the liberty to transfer “is not what we would

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

PENNER, supra note 104, at 6.
Id. at 13.
The power to license is the ability to allow what would otherwise be a trespass.
PENNER, supra note 104, at 26.
Id. at 27.
Id.
Merrill & Smith, supra note 100, at 1869.
PENNER, supra note 104, at 26.

2022]

ESCAPING CIRCULARITY

663

normally conceive of as a right of ownership.”126 And as Merrill explained,
the right to exclude is not only “‘one of the most essential’ constituents of
property—it is the sine qua non. Give someone the right to exclude others
from a valued resource . . . and you give them property.”127 Ultimately, BOR
fails to acknowledge what Chief Justice Roberts succinctly expressed: “The
question of who owns what is pretty important.”128
Furthermore, by failing to determine which subset of the bundle entails
property ownership (e.g., A, B, or C), this conceptualization also fails to
provide legal mechanisms to determine whether any asset is property at all.
Property would simply serve “a peculiar linguistic role, as an identifier that
a certain sort of legal or philosophical discussion has concluded.”129
Property, in this case, would be a conclusory statement “only used
prescriptively . . . [and] never used descriptively, to characterize a normative
situation simply because of the features it manifests.”130
Returning to the broader topic of this Article, it is also noteworthy that
a prescriptive BOR definition of property could not be more circular. A
specific bundle of rights would be called property simply as a legal
conclusion that courts have deemed it so. As Arnold S. Weinrib noted, “[t]he
fact that property is a conclusory term does not help us decide in what
circumstances property rights should be awarded.”131
For our purposes, this would also mean that BOR does not help us
decide in what novel circumstances the Fourth Amendment offers protection.
These discrepancies between BOR’s conclusions and our “intuitions” of
property132 can be seen both in the Supreme Court’s own struggle to apply
the bundle metaphor and in the conceptual ramifications of BOR itself, as
described in the following two Sections.
1. Explanatory Problems
At least two foundational aspects of property law cannot be accounted
for under a BOR conceptualization of property. Nonetheless, both aspects
are frequently referenced by the Supreme Court. The first is that while the
Supreme Court adopts the language of the bundle metaphor, it
126. Id. at 26–27. Rather, according to Penner, the “high-level or abstract concepts” he
“identified in the tripartite structure of title do structure our understanding of property rights and
property law doctrine, and do so splendidly.” PENNER, supra note 104, at 42.
127. Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 730 (1998)
(quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)).
128. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1953 (2017) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
129. Penner, supra note 4, at 771.
130. Id.
131. Arnold S. Weinrib, Information and Property, 38 U. TORONTO L.J. 117, 121 (1988).
132. Penner, supra note 4, at 773.
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simultaneously rejects the idea that all sticks in the bundle are of equal
importance and that none are privileged in the conceptualization of property
or ownership. Above, I noted that Justice Sotomayor referred to the
“common idiom” used to describe property as a “bundle of sticks.”133
Immediately afterwards, however, she clarifies that the “[r]ights to exclude
and to use are two of the most crucial sticks in the bundle.”134 By ranking
these sticks above all or almost all others, Justice Sotomayor rejects BOR’s
thesis that any sticks in the bundle “can be put together or pulled apart at will,
such that any configuration is, more or less, [still] a realization of our concept
of property or ownership.”135 Justice Sotomayor’s perspective is not merely
dicta that deviates from the theoretical conclusions of BOR––it is the default
position of the Supreme Court.136 This ranking of sticks in the bundle is also
the position widely adopted by most, if not all, state courts.137
The second manner in which BOR’s conclusions do not align with the
Supreme Court’s application of the bundle metaphor lies in the realm of
regulatory takings. Consider the “notorious ‘denominator problem.’”138 To
determine whether government action amounts to a taking, the Supreme
Court casts “what was possessed (y) versus what was taken (x) as the integers
of an arithmetic fraction . . . where the nearer x/y comes to 1 the greater the
probability of a taking.”139 While the normative, doctrinal, and economic
consequences of the Court’s jurisprudence on regulatory takings could
themselves fill up many articles, all that is required here is a mere superficial
understanding of the denominator y and what it logically entails. Because
“the Court has generally evaluated the impact of regulations on the value of
the [property] parcel as a whole, rather than on any subpart of ownership

133. Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1937–38 (2019) (Sotomayor,
J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 278 (2002)) (noting that “[r]ights to
exclude and to use are two of the most crucial sticks in the bundle”).
134. Id. The Supreme Court of Texas implemented the same two-step adoption and qualification
of the bundle metaphor in Lightning Oil Co. v. Anadarko E&P Onshore, LLC, 520 S.W.3d 39, 48
(Tex. 2017).
135. PENNER, supra note 104, at 15.
136. See e.g., Craft, 535 U.S. at 283 (“[T]he most essential property rights [are] the right to use
the property, to receive income produced by it, and to exclude others from it.”); Coll. Sav. Bank v.
Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 673 (1999) (“The hallmark of a
protected property interest is the right to exclude others.”); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S.
164, 176 (1979) (“[T]he owner has somehow lost one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of
rights that are commonly characterized as property—the right to exclude others.”).
137. See e.g., Smith v. Town of Mendon, 822 N.E.2d 1214, 1219 (N.Y. 2004) (“[T]he most
important ‘stick’ in the proverbial bundle of property rights [is] the right to exclude others.”);
Lightning Oil Co., 520 S.W.3d at 48 (“[T]he right to exclude all others from the use of the property
[is] one of the most essential sticks in the bundle.” (citation omitted)).
138. Carol M. Rose, Rations and Takings, 2020 WIS. L. REV. 343, 351 (2020).
139. Jamison E. Colburn, Don’t Go in the Water: On Pathological Jurisdiction Splitting, 39
STAN. ENV’T L.J. 3, 37 n.253 (2019).
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rights,” the bounds of the composite property bundle (i.e., the bounds of the
property parcel as a whole) are frequently dispositive of whether a taking has
occurred.140
In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York,141 for example,
the Supreme Court noted that “‘[t]aking’ jurisprudence does not divide a
single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to determine whether rights
in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated.”142 Rather, as Joseph
Blocher summarized, “[t]he Court held that takings claims should instead be
assessed according to ‘the nature and extent of the interference with rights in
the parcel as a whole.’”143 This reliance on defining the parcel as a whole
smuggles with it concepts which are antithetical to BOR. Under BOR,
complex property rights such as “A’s fee simple title to Blackacre[] [would]
have no genuine or real normative force within the legal system.”144 Only
individual “Hohfeldian jural relations themselves, taken one by one,” would
carry legal weight.145
The Court’s doctrinal use of a denominator y, which refers to the
complex sum of property rights (i.e., the whole parcel), is therefore
incompatible with BOR; BOR would indeed “divide a single parcel into
discrete segments” (i.e., discrete Hohfeldian relationships) “and attempt to
determine whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely
abrogated” (i.e., attempt to determine which Hohfeldian relationships have
been altered).146 The Court’s analysis requires that the full fee simple title to
Blackacre carry normative force and legal conclusions, which, as stated, is in
violation of BOR’s theses.147
2. Theoretical Incoherence
BOR’s attractiveness can be described through an analogy: If I have a
piece of apple pie and I want you to have some, what should I do? I could
give you my entire piece, as unrealistic as that would be. More plausibly, I

140. Joseph Blocher, Bans, 129 YALE L.J. 308, 332 (2019).
141. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
142. Id. at 130.
143. Blocher, supra note 140, at 332 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 130–31).
144. PENNER, supra note 104, at 2.
145. Id.
146. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 130–31.
147. The alternative rejected approach has been called “conceptual severance,” under which the
“court would not have considered the possibility of a . . . denominator[] because the conceptualseverance doctrine disregards the denominator problem and automatically treats the severed use
interest as an entire, free-standing unit of property.” Courtney C. Tedrowe, Conceptual Severance
and Takings in the Federal Circuit, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 586, 615 (2000) (citing Margaret Jane
Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 1667, 1676 (1988)).
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could cut my piece in half and give you (the smaller) half of my original
piece. Notably, both halves were in existence prior to the cutting; the
transaction merely severed them. By applying this thought process to
property, it would seem that “the power to grant interests is the power to
transfer one’s own interest. So the “power to grant a different, ‘lesser’
interest must then be a power to ‘divide’ one’s [existing] interest, handing a
piece to X.”148 This conceptualization can be traced back to Hohfeld’s idea
of multital rights: “A multital right, or claim, (right in rem) is always one of
a large class of fundamentally similar yet separate rights, actual and
potential, residing in a single person . . . but availing respectively against
persons constituting a very large and indefinite class of people.”149
This property bundle is envisioned to contain all actual and all future
jural relations as currently “residing in a single person” who can disaggregate
relations at will.150 Another way to think about this is that instead of
conceiving of property as “a right which permits an owner to do anything or
nothing with his property . . . [the BOR] thesis insists that an owner may do
everything with his property.”151 By conceptually referring to all actual and
potential jural relations, BOR “holds that the essence of property is an infinite
number of rights to use a thing, in the same way that the Hohfeldian idea of
a right in rem entails having millions of rights against all other people.”152
Although such conceptualizations may seem innocuous (or merely just
inconsequential legal semantics), when BOR is used to explain the
mechanisms behind various property doctrines, problems begin to emerge.
Consider, for example, property licenses. The power to license can be
defined as: “the right to decide how and by whom the thing owned shall be
used. This right depends, legally, on a cluster of powers, chiefly powers of
licensing acts which would otherwise be unlawful and powers of
contracting.”153
Imagine that Blackacre’s owner O wants to lease the property to lessee
L. When the owner O “grants a lease to Blackacre, the [BOR] analysis of
this transaction is not that he exercised a power to create an interest in
Blackacre that did not exist before . . . but rather that he transferred some pre-

148. PENNER, supra note 104, at 24.
149. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 26 YALE L. J. 710, 718 (1917) (emphasis added and altered) (footnote omitted).
150. Id. (emphasis omitted).
151. Penner, supra note 4, at 758.
152. Id. (emphasis omitted).
153. Honoré, supra note 101, at 116. This is Honoré’s right to manage. The right to license may
also rely on Honoré’s the right to use (which “refers to the owner’s personal use and enjoyment of
the thing owned”) and the right to income (which refers to rights to the “brute product of a thing,
made by nature or by other persons”). Id. at 116–17.
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existing lease-stick in his bundle to the lessee.”154 Because Hohfeldian jural
relations are strictly bipolar,155 the lease-stick transferred in this transaction
would consist of the bipolar relation between O and L. It would be the stick
holding L, as the relation’s single specified individual, liable to O for trespass
onto O’s land. The transaction would also involve the multiple bipolar
relations holding L, as the single specified individual for each relation, liable
to O for enjoyment of Blackacre. While this conceptualization is already
complicated, the situation becomes exponentially more complex when
theorizing non-exclusive licenses. As Penner concludes:
However various are the rights in the owner’s bundle, it boggles
the mind to suppose that it includes actual rights permitting
everyone else to do everything with the property, each of which
can be transferred to the proper person at will. But this is what the
disaggregative bundle of rights thesis requires to account for nonexclusive licenses. On this view, A, the owner, holds in his bundle
of rights the millions of rights of B to do each and every thing with
A’s property, and the millions of rights of C, and D, ad
infinitum. . . . If it is a non-exclusive license, then A can do the
same in turn for C or D. . . . The disaggregative bundle of rights
thesis logically entails that an owner of a piece of property holds
the rights that every person could conceivably have to use that
particular thing, i.e., that the owner is actually all owners in one;
that when anyone is born or dies the owner’s bundle of rights
changes; that there is some way to either . . . individuate or define
these millions of rights as discrete, countable legal relations, etc.156
As Penner noted, “[t]his is not mere nit-picking.”157 If property law is
meant to guide expectations,158 allocate ownership,159 facilitate social
interaction,160 and, as the Supreme Court has held, “empower[] persons to
shape and to plan their own destiny,”161 then it must also be adequately

154. PENNER, supra note 104, at 20.
155. Under BOR and Hohfeld’s own analysis, in rem mutital rights are nothing more than
millions of bipolar Hohfeldian relations.
156. Penner, supra note 4, at 758–59.
157. Id. at 758.
158. Id. at 759.
159. See James Y. Stern, The Essential Structure of Property Law, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1167,
1168 (2017) (“Two people cannot both be complete owners of the same thing . . . . It may take a
moment to absorb this idea—precisely because it is so obvious—but it is fundamental to the
structure of property law.”); see also John A. Humbach, Property as Prophesy: Legal Realism and
the Indeterminacy of Ownership, 49 CASE W. RSRV. J. INT’L L. 211, 224 (2017).
160. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 100, at 1850 (“Property is a device for coordinating both
personal and impersonal interactions over things.”).
161. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1943 (2017) (“Property rights are necessary to preserve
freedom.”); see also United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 61 (1993)
(“Individual freedom finds tangible expression in property rights.”).
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understood by those relying on it.162 As Penner ultimately concludes, “[a]ny
normative system whose purpose is actually to guide people’s behavior,
including how they should think about what they are doing, must founder on
this kind of profound confusion of potentiality with actuality.”163
Thus, because it fails to adequately explain jurisprudence, and because
it leads to a conceptually incoherent theoretical understanding of private
ordering, BOR cannot serve as the foundation of property law. Notably, this
is the case even without considering property law’s role in the Fourth
Amendment. But for such constitutional purposes, it is also important to note
that BOR fails to provide us with a mechanism to determine when and where
property rights are found without resorting to the same circularity that
property law was meant to avoid. Does this mean that Fourth Amendment
doctrine is doomed to be circular even when relying on property law? Not
necessarily. Fourth Amendment doctrine may be spared from circularity if
BOR is ultimately rejected as the default conceptualization of property law.
In the second half of this Article, I will demonstrate that the concept of
legal thinghood, espoused by leading property scholars, provides the
necessary analytical and theoretical tools to understand the directionality,
autonomy, and scope of property law as a means for private ordering without
resorting to BOR’s circularity.
III. PROPERTY LAW AS NEW PRIVATE LAW
So far, this Article has analyzed the history of BOR and discussed how
it neither maps fully onto American property law nor solves the Fourth
Amendment’s circularity problem. In the second half of this Article,
alternative conceptualizations of property law are proposed, which may not
only provide an analytical definition of property rights, but may also ground
property law while providing a solution to circularity. To do so, it is first
necessary to address the wider philosophical background of American
property law to uncover what the concept of private law may bring to
property and circularity.
BOR and the wider law and economics movement find their roots in the
utilitarian theories proposed by Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill.164
These theories collapsed the distinction between private and public rights,
arguing that “[a]ll social policy,” from property law to constitutional law,
“must be justified by the criterion of collective social welfare—the greatest

162. In these ways, property law is similar to other fields of private law. As Merrill notes,
“[p]rivate law supplies the tools that make private ordering possible—the discretionary decisions
that individuals make in structuring their lives.” Merrill, supra note 69.
163. Penner, supra note 4, at 759.
164. Merrill, supra note 69, at 586–87.
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good for the greatest number—taking into account both aggregate wealth and
distributional considerations.”165 The legal movements derived from these
utilitarian theories attempted to debunk “any notion of natural rights,”
replacing all notions of naturalness with the notions of political choice.166
Bentham “argued that without law there would be no property.”167 He
“extolled the legislator who, above all else, protects the security of property
rights” not because they are inherently important, but rather because, in his
view, property rights are fully within the legislator’s control to design,
protect, and optimize, as any other public right.168 In this way, property is
seen as “post-political,” a creation of the government through a public
political apparatus.169
By conceptualizing all law as public law, proponents of these theories
claimed that the “private rights of property . . . exist only ‘at the sufferance
of the state’” and only until the state decides to retract them.170 As may have
become apparent, the American Legal Realist movement was a
“jurisprudential offshoot” of these utilitarian theories,171 bringing with it
ideas which ultimately crystalized into the modern understanding of BOR.
The utilitarian tradition, however, is not property law’s only
philosophical foundation. Another foundational conceptualization of
American property law stems from what Merrill calls “liberal
individualism.”172 In this tradition, private law “is the law that is anchored
in the natural rights of individuals and protects individuals from having these
rights taken without their consent” whether by “absolutism, class hierarchy,
or majoritarian bias.”173
In Germany, for example, ideas of liberal individualism were adopted
and expanded upon such that private law was treated “as an autonomous body

165. Id. Bentham, for example, defended property law “in terms of the stimulus to industry and
cultivation that it affords, stress[ing] that the benefits of property accrue both to persons of wealth
and to those living at the margin of existence.” Merrill & Smith, supra note 91, at 363 (footnote
omitted) (citing JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 101–02, 113–14, 116–19 (C.K.
Ogden ed., 1st ed. 1931)).
166. Merrill, supra note 69, at 587.
167. Id. (citing BENTHAM, supra note 165, at 113). According to Bentham, “[p]roperty and law
are born together, and die together. Before laws were made there was no property take away laws,
and property ceases.” BENTHAM, supra note 165, at 113.
168. Merrill & Smith, supra note 91, at 363 (emphasis added).
169. See Nestor M. Davidson, Standardization and Pluralism in Property Law, 61 VAND. L.
REV. 1597, 1645 (2008).
170. Merrill, supra note 69, at 587 (citing BARBARA H. FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON
LAISSEZ FAIRE: ROBERT HALE AND THE FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT 87 (1998)).
171. Id.
172. Id. at 585.
173. Id.
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of law having no connection to public law or the state.”174 German private
law “had no social responsibilities” and was therefore “kept strictly free of
any interference by the state.”175
While the Anglo-American legal tradition did not follow the German
model, private law was nonetheless seen as distinct, building on ideas
proposed by Thomas Hobbes and John Locke.176 These liberal individualistic
theories saw property rights as inalienable pre-legal natural rights that existed
independently of the state. This claim is not merely philosophical; it is also
historical. Proponents of liberal individualism note that the “role of private
law preceded the idea of the modern state.”177 Concepts of pre-legal natural
rights were eventually “packaged by Blackstone as core principles of the
common law.”178 As Justice Thomas recounted:
In the tradition of John Locke, William Blackstone in his
Commentaries identified the private rights to life, liberty, and
property as the three “absolute” rights—so called because they
“appertain[ed] and belong[ed] to particular men . . . merely as
individuals,” not “to them as members of society [or] standing in
various relations to each other”—that is, not dependent upon the
will of the government.179
This distinction meant that over time, Anglo-American common law
evolved to contain a “highly individualistic jurisprudence that regarded
private property as nearly inviolate.”180 In the United States, these ideas took
the form of “Lockean natural rights adopted as constitutional rights.”181 As
Justice Stewart explained:
174. Id.
175. Hans-Peter Haferkamp, The Science of Private Law and the State in Nineteenth Century
Germany, 56 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 667, 684 (2008).
176. Merrill, supra note 69, at 585.
177. Hanoch Dagan, Autonomy and Pluralism in Private Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
THE NEW PRIVATE LAW, supra note 25, at 177, 177.
178. Merrill, supra note 69, at 586. Common law was itself a “distillation of custom that existed
from time immemorial.” Id.
179. Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1965 (2015) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 119
(1765)) (alteration in original) (emphasis added).
180. Merrill, supra note 69, at 586.
181. Id.; see also O. Lee Reed, What Is “Property”?, 41 AM. BUS. L. J. 459, 473 (2004) (noting
that property’s “basic aspect is constitutional”). On a surface level, property is constitutionally
protected by the Due Process Clause. But that is not the only place where liberal individualism and
its perspectives of property law are constitutionally present. As Justice Thomas observed, “[t]he
concept of security in property recognized by Locke and the English legal tradition appeared
throughout the materials that inspired the Fourth Amendment.” Carpenter v. United States, 138 S.
Ct. 2206, 2239 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Notably, the distinction between public and private
rights has a long tradition in both federal and state courts, including in the public rights doctrine.
See, e.g., Lansing v. Smith, 4 Wend. 9, 21 (N.Y. 1829) (“The right to navigate the public waters of
the state . . . are all public rights belonging to the people at large. They are not the private
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It is a purpose of the ancient institution of property to protect those
claims upon which people rely in their daily lives, reliance that
must not be arbitrarily undermined. It is a purpose of the
constitutional right to a hearing to provide an opportunity for a
person to vindicate those claims.182
With these two radically different foundations, it is no wonder that
American property law has struggled to find a coherent identity.183 With
Utilitarianism as one parent and Liberal Individualism as the other, property
law (and the language used to describe it) has floundered in its attempt at
conceptual unity and coherence. Merrill explains this struggle through a
historical lens:
[T]he foundation of the public-private distinction was laid at a time
when the liberal view was ascendant, with its strong intuitive
understanding of private rights as the rights of individuals
grounded in natural law. That foundation still exists, but is
submerged under a thick stratum of utilitarian theory, with its
central assumption that there is no such thing as natural rights, and
hence no meaningful distinction between private and public
rights.184

unalienable rights of each individual. Hence the legislature as the representatives of the public may
restrict and regulate the exercise of those rights in such manner as may be deemed most beneficial
to the public at large; provided they do not interfere with vested rights which have been granted to
individuals.”); see also Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd., 135 S. Ct. at 1965 (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(“This distinction [between public and private rights] is significant to our understanding of Article
III, for while the legislative and executive branches may dispose of public rights at will . . . an
exercise of the judicial power is required ‘when the government want[s] to act authoritatively upon
core private rights . . . .’” (second alteration in original) (quoting Caleb Nelson, Adjudication in the
Political Branches, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 559, 569 (2007)). More recently, this distinction has been
crucial in determining the nature of patent rights. See, e.g., Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v.
Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1373–74 (2018) (“This Court has long recognized
that the grant of a patent is a ‘matte[r] involving public rights.’ . . . That right ‘did not exist at
common law.’ . . . Rather, it is a ‘creature of statute law.’ . . . Accordingly, the determination to
grant a patent is a ‘matte[r] involving public rights.’ . . . It need not be adjudicated in Article III
court.”) (first quoting United States v. Duell, 172 U.S. 576, 582–83 (1899); then quoting Gayler v.
Wilder, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 477, 494 (1851); and then quoting Crown Die & Tool Co. v. Nye Tool
& Machine Works, 261 U.S. 24, 40 (1923)).
182. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (emphasis added).
183. Penner also notes that even within BOR itself, the Hohfeld-Honoré synthesis struggles with
conflicting approaches to legal theory. “The synthesis rests upon a fairly serious mistake, which is
that while the Hohfeldian examination of jural norms is analytic if it is anything, Honoré’s
elaboration of the incidents making up ownership is anything but—it is functional.” J.E. Penner,
Property, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE NEW PRIVATE LAW, supra note 25, at 277, 279
(footnote omitted).
184. Merrill, supra note 69, at 588–89. Hanoch Dagan and Avihay Dorfman provide another
take:
For more than a century, most approaches to the study of private law have been
divided . . . into two categories. On the one side are the traditionalists, who argue that
private law expresses an apolitical idea of ordering horizontal interactions between
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Despite this complexity, Merrill proposes that an analysis of property
law within the New Private Law research framework may help untangle these
conflicting approaches and provide a solution to circularity.185 Rather than
merely describing private law, the New Private Law aims to explain it. The
New Private Law acknowledges the central role of “legal concepts and
reasoning” in legal systems while incorporating “understanding of how legal
institutions work in practice, of what fact patterns impact judicial
psychology, and of which cognitive biases or heuristics are in play.”186 By
relying on fields ranging from psychology187 to systems theory,188 this
research framework takes “institutional constraints seriously as a source of
explanation of what we do and do not find” in private law.189 It is this New
Private Law analysis that provides the basis for the rest of this Article.
Functionally speaking, “private law can be said to be the law that
supports private ordering” while “public law is the law that generates public
goods that must be collectively supplied because they cannot be adequately
supplied through private ordering.”190 This functional approach can be
visualized as follows: Private law governs the “horizontal relations” between
individuals; public law, on the other hand, “governs the “vertical
relationship” between the individual and the [state].”191 In order to live their
lives, pursue their goals, and plan for their futures, individuals employ the
legal “tools” provided by private law.192 These tools allow individuals to
reasonably rely on “a temporally extended horizon of action.”193 They protect
“private authority over resources” and allow individuals “to reliably benefit
formally free and equal persons. On the other side are critical thinkers and lawyereconomists, who take private law to be nothing more than an offshoot of public law that
hides well its fundamentally regulatory orientation.
Hanoch Dagan & Avihay Dorfman, Just Relationships, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1395, 1459 (2016).
185. Merrill, supra note 69, at 578.
186. Andrew S. Gold, Internal and External Perspectives: On Methodology in the New Private
Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE NEW PRIVATE LAW, supra note 25, at 3–4, 7.
187. See generally Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Psychology and the New Private Law, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF THE NEW PRIVATE LAW, supra note 25, at 125.
188. See generally Smith, supra note 115.
189. Smith, supra note 26, at 1700.
190. Merrill, supra note 69, at 578. This functional perspective circumvents the various
potentially conflicting definitions of public and private law floating in the American judiciary and
academy. Other definitions currently in use include: (a) a mere “classification of different fields of
law. Property, contracts, torts, and restitution are generally agreed to be private law. Constitutional,
administrative, criminal, and tax law are regarded as public law”; (b) a distinction based on “the
presence or absence of the government as a party”; (c) a distinction based on the “source of law,”
where “[p]rivate law is thought to have its source in customary or common law . . . public law is
grounded in positive law enacted by the sovereign”; (d) a distinction based on the “number of
persons affected by the individual applications of the law.” Id. at 576–77.
191. Id. at 578.
192. Id.
193. Dagan, supra note 177, at 178.

2022]

ESCAPING CIRCULARITY

673

from others’ promises.”194 Ultimately, as Hanoch Dagan summarized, these
tools are “conducive, perhaps crucial, to people’s ability to plan.”195
It is important to note that employing these legal tools does not mean
turning to litigation. Quite the opposite. Private law empowers individuals
to pursue their goals by protecting their reliance on social behavior.
Crucially, private law could not “exist without a significant degree of
voluntary compliance,” as most private ordering never sees the inside of a
lawyer’s office, let alone a courtroom.196 It is a shared understanding about
the content of social norms that allows private law to serve as a tool for
private ordering, and allows property law, specifically, to serve as a “device
for coordinating both personal and impersonal interactions over things.”197
Unlike public law, which “can deviate more sharply from social norms,”
private law must comply with three general features to fulfill its role in
protecting individuals’ reliance interests and in continuously promoting
voluntary compliance.198 Under the New Private Law research framework,
private law must: (1) “draw from and reinforce social norms;” (2) “evolve
slowly and incrementally;” and (3) “at any point in time enjoy a high degree
of consensus about its content.”199
How does this analysis of private law relate to our discussions of the
Fourth Amendment? Let us return to the Supreme Court’s untested
assumption that prompted this Article. The Supreme Court, in its attempts to
avoid circularity, turned to property law as a litmus test to measure society’s
expectations, which were purportedly insulated from the Court’s rulings.
Without saying so, the Court assumed that “society’s traditional
commitments” were “reflected in positive property law”200 so much so that
property law was seen as sufficiently insulated from government
manipulation for Fourth Amendment purposes.
In the first half of this Article, I demonstrated how a BOR analysis of
property would, if anything, undermine the Court’s rationale. This New
Private Law analysis, on the other hand, may provide a way in which property
law could indeed be sufficiently grounded in social norms to fulfill its role as
a solution to doctrinal circularity. Notably, this approach is not foreign to the
Supreme Court. In fact, in its Fifth Amendment jurisprudence, the Court has
194. Id.
195. Id. (“Moreover, contract and alienable property are also key for people’s mobility, which is
a prerequisite for self-determination . . . .”).
196. Merrill, supra note 69, at 578.
197. Merrill & Smith, supra note 100, at 1850.
198. Merrill, supra note 69, at 578.
199. Id. (“These features also explain why private law tends to be anchored in history, whether
through custom, settled precedent, or the jus commune derived from Roman law.”).
200. Kahn-Fogel, supra note 32, at 133 (noting positive law can be reflected through “statutory
law or common law principles”).
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already relied on property law’s foundations in shared social expectations to
avoid circularity in cases concerning takings. In Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council,201 for example, Justice Kennedy explained the possible
circularity in the definition of “reasonable, investment-backed expectations”
while also clarifying how property law may provide tools to escape this
problem.202
Notice that in spite of BOR and the idea that property is a vacuous term
with no core features, Justice Kennedy rejected the circular analysis that
“property tends to become what courts say it is.”203 He noted that property
also relies on “objective rules and customs that can be understood as
reasonable by all parties involved.”204 This shared understanding, according
to Justice Kennedy, provides an independent—or objective—foundation to
property law and serves as a solution to circularity. Justice Kennedy
independently deduced Merrill’s requirement that private law be based on
shared social norms that “enjoy a high degree of consensus about its
content.”205 In this way, the Supreme Court has already shown an interest in
non-BOR conceptualization of property law to solve problems of
circularity.206
IV. NEW PRIVATE LAW’S SOLUTION TO CIRCULARITY
In the rest of this Article, I apply a New Private Law analysis of property
to avoid circularity by sufficiently grounding it in shared social expectations,
which are drawn both from cognitive principles and from the very fabric of

201. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
202. Id. at 1034 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
203. Id. at 1034–35 (“The Takings Clause, while conferring substantial protection on property
owners, does not eliminate the police power of the State to enact limitations on the use of their
property. . . . Where a taking is alleged from regulations which deprive the property of all value,
the test must be whether the deprivation is contrary to reasonable, investment-backed expectations.
There is an inherent tendency towards circularity in this synthesis, of course; for if the owner’s
reasonable expectations are shaped by what courts allow as a proper exercise of governmental
authority, property tends to become what courts say it is. . . . The definition, moreover, is not
circular in its entirety. The expectations protected by the Constitution are based on objective rules
and customs that can be understood as reasonable by all parties involved.”) (emphasis added)
(citation omitted).
204. Id. at 1035. But note that in other cases, Justice Kennedy’s takings reasoning has been
deemed “unavoidabl[y]” circular. See Gregory M. Stein, Takings in the 21st Century: Reasonable
Investment-Backed Expectations After Palazzolo and Tahoe-Sierra, 69 TENN. L. REV. 891, 934
(2002), citing Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001) as a prime example.
205. Merrill, supra note 69, at 578.
206. It is also possible that certain takings can be characterized as limits to the private right to
contract rather than the removal of a stick in the property bundle. Penner explains that in “the case
of rent control . . . “the interference here is not with rights of property, but interference in the
property market. . . . [It interferes with the market] by directly interfering with the right to make
contracts, which is exactly what rent control does.” Penner, supra note 4, at 815.
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our social engagements. Based on this understanding, certain core aspects of
property law are emergent from society and from aspects of human cognition.
Therefore, without fully manipulating the underlying fabric of society or of
human cognition, these core features of property law cannot be altered
without also undermining its very role as a tool for private ordering.207
It is in this way that property law may indeed serve as a solution to
Fourth Amendment circularity. It may also serve as a means to determine
when and why property law “keeps easy cases easy.”208 This solution,
however, requires a more nuanced and coherent analysis (and language) of
property law than the Court currently employs.
A. The Intension and Extension of Property Law
This alternative conceptualization of property law, stemming from the
New Private Law research framework, suggests that property rights may be
understood as emergent complexes of relations and norms whose internal
coherence is meaningful. What may be surprising is that this analysis
nonetheless refers to BOR’s building blocks, including Hohfeldian jural
relations and the Hohfeld-Honoré Synthesis tripartite structure of title.209
Such building blocks, however, are the emergent features or consequences of
underlying property principles rather than property’s foundation. To
understand how this can be so, it is first important to distinguish between
intensional and extensional definitions. The New Private Law provides an
intension to property law whereas BOR itemizes property’s extension. Here,
the function of mathematical multiplication serves as an illustrative example.
We know that 1 x 1 = 1, 1 x 2 = 2, and 2 x 4 = 8. Many, if not most of
us, were even expected to memorize a full ten-by-ten (or twelve-by-twelve)
multiplication table in early childhood.210 Frequently, children begin to learn
the concept of multiplication by simply aggregating individual

207. A more normative take on this argument is “[g]iven that reciprocal respect for selfdetermination is the premise of private law’s own legitimacy, any attempt to recruit private law in
defiance of this premise must be treated as ultra vires: it is an abuse of the idea of property or of
contract, that is, use of private law for a purpose that contravenes its telos.” Dagan, supra note 177,
at 178.
208. Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 11 (2013).
209. The tripartite structure of title, according to Penner’s analysis of the Hohfeld-Honoré
Synthesis discussed above, is that title contains the “possessory right, namely the right to immediate,
exclusive possession,” the “power to license others to enter into or take possession whilst retaining
title,” and “the power to dispose of one’s title, by grant of lesser title or transfer outright.” PENNER,
supra note 104, at 6, 13, 15; see also supra Section II.B.
210. See John Trivett, The Multiplication Table: To Be Memorized or Mastered?, FOR
LEARNING MATHEMATICS, July 1980, at 21, 21–22; see also Rob Eastaway, In Praise of the 12
Times Table, BBC NEWS BLOG (Jul. 8, 2013), https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-magazinemonitor-23230183.
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“multiplication facts” through “statements like: ‘three times two is six.’”211
Until we understand the underlying process that multiplication is meant to
represent, we are simply expected to memorize a set of facts in the arbitrary
shape of multiplicand x multiplier = product.212
Is this set of facts truly the definition of multiplication? Your instinct
may be that it is not, but to complicate the question further, imagine that this
set included the infinite list of all possible multiplication operations. If one
had access to this set, one would have access to all possible multiplication
facts. This infinite set is called the extensional definition of multiplication.
Extensional definitions describe “a concept by enumerating all of its
subordinate concepts under one criterion of subdivision.”213
More
concretely, a concept’s “extension is the set of all objects [or facts] in the
‘actual’ world which fall under the concept.”214
Notice that if this extensional definition were accepted as truth, nothing
in the “actual world” would change.215 All multiplication results would
remain the same. Children, however, do not have infinite memory to learn
all possible multiplication facts.216 Yet, they are asked to calculate operations
such as 15 x 2, which were never memorized in the first place. How do we
know that the answer is 30 without much difficulty? It is because we
understand the intensional definition of multiplication, the underlying
process or rules that multiplication represents (e.g., 15 x 2 = 15 + 15 = 30).217
By specifying a concept’s underlying principles, the concept’s “intension”
can uncover “the set of objects that fall under the concept in ‘all possible
worlds,’” even in those we have not yet encountered or memorized.218 Rather
211. Trivett, supra note 210, at 21 (emphasis added).
212. Or factor x factor = product.
213. Georg Löckinger, Hendrik J. Kockaert & Gerhard Budin, Intensional Definitions, in 1
HANDBOOK OF TERMINOLOGY 61, 67 n.4 (Hendrik J. Kockaert & Frieda Steurs eds., 2015).
214. James A. Hampton, Concepts, in THE MIT ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE COGNITIVE SCIENCES
176, 177 (Robert A. Wilson & Frank C. Keil eds., 2001).
215. Id.
216. In this way, extensional approaches to multiplication parallel extensional approaches to
linguistics and cognition: “[E]xtensional definition[s are] of limited interest from a cognitive point
of view and a more fruitful generative approach entails the specification of (finite) [intensional]
mechanisms . . . [including] principles of combinations as well as non-terminal symbols over which
these mechanisms operate.” Karl Magnus Petersson, On the Relevance of the Neurobiological
Analogue of the Finite-State Architecture, 65 NEUROCOMPUTING 825, 826 (2005).
217. Löckinger et al., supra note 213, at 63–64 (explaining that an intensional definition
“describes the intension of a concept by stating the generic concept and the delimiting
characteristics” where the generic concept is the “superordinate concept”).
218. Hampton, supra note 214, at 177 (emphasis added). The definitions of intension and
extension presented here are philosophical in nature. Nonetheless, the cognitive implementation of
these ideas provides the same support for the arguments of this Article. In cognitive science, an
intension “resembles a dictionary definition, in that each concept is defined by its relation to others.”
Id. For example, “chairs are for sitting on.” Id. Meanwhile, an extension is “the class of objects,
actions, or situations in the actual external world which the concept represents and to which the
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than merely enumerating items that fit within the concept, intensional
definitions “highlight characteristics that would otherwise be hidden.”219
In fact, Merriam-Webster defines multiplication through an intensional
definition: “a mathematical operation that at its simplest is an abbreviated
process of adding an integer to zero a specified number of times and that is
extended to other numbers in accordance with laws that are valid for
integers.”220 This definition allows us to apply the concept of multiplication
to scenarios never previously seen. Notably, for our purposes, a well-formed
“intensional definition should not be written in a way that makes it circular
either within itself, in reference to the relevant term or in connection with
other intensional definitions of the same language resource.”221
Circularity, however, is inherent in extensional approaches; extensional
concepts are defined as nothing more than their enumerated contents. In
other words, extensionally, the answer to whether something falls within
concept X can only be answered by looking up whether it falls within concept
X.
Applying these ideas to property law, we can see that a realist
Hohfeldian BOR conceptualization of property is extensional. BOR
“purports to explain or analyse a norm of general applicability as a series of
special individual jural relations.”222 The problem here “is that even if we
could spell out exhaustively all the jural relations in which A stands, we
would have no understanding of the laws that govern A.”223 In other words,
the extensional enumeration of jural relations does not contain any
information with which to determine the intension of property, the rules and
definitions that govern where, when, and how property rights are found. It is
merely circular. Ultimately, as Penner concluded:
All of this grants the Hohfeldian [theorist] the assumption that, in
principle, at any time one could provide a complete snapshot of

concept term therefore refers (Frege’s ‘reference’).” Id. For example, the extension of chair is the
set of all existing objects that are represented by the concept of chair.
219. Löckinger et al., supra note 213, at 67.
220. Multiplication,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/multiplication (last visited Nov. 13, 2020).
221. Löckinger et al., supra note 213, at 72 (emphasis added). It is also important to
acknowledge that for every extensional definition there are an infinite number of intensional
definitions. For an analysis of a faulty—and circular—implementation of intentional definitions in
the context of property law, see João Marinotti, Possessing Intangibles, 116 NW. U. L. REV.
(forthcoming
2022)
(manuscript
at
20–21
n.
118–23),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3834643.
222. PENNER, supra note 104, at 56. An intensional approach to property could also make use
of jural relations and a tripartite structure of title. These elements, however, would not themselves
be the intension of property; rather, jural relations and structures of title emerge when the intension
of property is applied to existing facts.
223. Id.
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A’s legal position, expressed as a series of Hohfeldian jural
relations between identified individuals. . . . [But] this does not
amount to an analysis. It provides no insight into the norms that
make up the law and, indeed, it tends to obscure them because,
purporting to be fundamental, it suggests that nothing further needs
to be said.224
Even so, one is left with a lingering question: Is it even possible to find
the intension of property, the underlying “norms that make up the law”?225
As discussed above, many of us were explicitly taught that such a task would
be fruitless.226 But perhaps ambitiously, certain property scholars are
attempting to do just that. Acknowledging the intension-extension
dichotomy, Smith and Merrill concluded that if the extensional approach “is
correct, it is unclear why it makes any sense to devote significant intellectual
energy to trying to restate the law of property” with any sort of coherence or
purpose.227 Of course, this is not their position, nor is it mine. Rather, these
property scholars believe that there is an intension of property law (i.e., an
“architecture”) that is “grounded in a basic commitment to owners’ exclusion
rights, modified by select governance regimes that respond to problems
generated in part by transaction costs.”228 It is this approach, rooted in the
New Private Law research framework, that may provide us with a solution to
circularity.229 Ultimately, the following Section provides a demonstration of
what an intensional private law of property could look like, and an analysis
of how and when property law could solve the problem of circularity.
At this point it is worth remembering that proving or disproving the
validity of property law as intensional private law or even the validity of the
New Private Law research framework is wholly outside the scope of this
Article. Rather, I merely aim to determine if there are any mechanisms by
which property law could coherently serve as a solution to circularity for the
purposes of the Fourth Amendment and beyond. If one seeks to retain the
realist bundle-of-rights conceptualization of property, the conclusion of this
Article is easy: Property law simply cannot escape circularity. However, if

224. Id.
225. Id.
226. See e.g., MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 71.
227. Merrill & Smith, supra note 4, at 683. In fact, the authors have argued that prior
restatements of property adopted a “concatenation of rules” conceptualization of property and that
this “choice of Hohfeldian framework, interpreted as the bundle of rights—with its atomized legal
relations and its reductionist approach to in rem rights—contributed to the shortcomings of the
Restatement of Property.” Id. at 683, 707.
228. Id. at 708.
229. Smith, supra note 26, at 1725 (“[T]he information-cost theory helps hold the New Private
Law together.”). Furthermore, this intension of property law, as expanded in Section IV.B., aligns
directly with Merrill’s three requisites of private law.
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one’s Fourth Amendment analyses continue to rely on property law, one must
also eschew the bundle-of-rights conceptualization of property.
Those hoping to rely on property must also acknowledge its existence
as intensional private law. Therefore, the following Section presents one
such analysis of property law as intensional private law, demonstrating that
such conceptualization could, in defined circumstances, aid in avoiding
circularity.
B. The Concept of Emergence in Property Law
With the goal of understanding an intensional, non-circular vision of
property law, let us begin with a single proposition: “Property law
coordinates activities and resolves conflict between members of society over
external resources.”230 Put simply, property law allocates the right to use
“things.”231 As a form of private law, it concerns the horizontal relationship
between individuals granting them the legal tools necessary to pursue their
goals.232 As noted above, to succeed (or even function), private law must
(1) align with or reinforce social customs; (2) evolve gradually and
iteratively; and (3) “enjoy a high degree of consensus about its content.”233
Such requirements are doubly true of property law, as property is “a platform
for the rest of private law.”234 These ideas, however, can quickly unravel if
applied haphazardly in the context of property:
If we think about all the effects produced by the [horizontal]
relation between each pair of persons and then unlimited chains of
such interactions—A sells Blackacre to B, who sells to C, who
mortgages to D and rents to E, and so on—then prescribing results
for such interactions is a potentially intractable problem.235
Itemizing the prescribed legal result of each horizontal interaction is,
simply, an intractable “nonstarter.”236 It would entail defining the “object of
property, specifying the legal interests in it, and providing notice to the
relevant parties, including duty bearers and enforcers” for each and every
thing and every one in society.237 The in rem nature of property rights entails
“duties owed by the rest of the world” to each owner to not deliberately or

230. Smith, supra note 17, at 2057.
231. Smith, supra note 26, at 1693 (“The purposes of property relate to our interest in using
things.”).
232. Merrill, supra note 69, at 578.
233. Id. (“These features also explain why private law tends to be anchored in history, whether
through custom, settled precedent, or the jus commune derived from Roman law.”).
234. Smith, supra note 26.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 1698, 1704.
237. Id. at 1698.
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carelessly interfere with the owned property.238 Therefore, every single
individual in society is a duty bearer for every owned asset and would,
consequently, require notice as a relevant party.239
Given this unmanageable complexity, Smith notes that while “it might
be interesting to think of property as a list of use rights availing pairwise
between all people in society” (i.e., the extensional approach), generating and
implementing this list would be an “impossible enterprise.”240 The
information cost of this extensional system would be prohibitive; the
institution of property law would fail to serve the goal of allocating usage
rights.
The role of information costs for a functional and efficient system of
property can also be seen in a more concrete example. Imagine that Juliette
owns a fully paved parking lot on Blackacre that sits above fresh
groundwater.241 Juliette’s parking lot does not need or use the groundwater.
Kendra’s farm next door, on the other hand, is suffering because of this year’s
drought and is in desperate need of water. Without water, Kendra cannot
grow the heirloom tomatoes that Juliette loves to buy at the local farmer’s
market. Optimally, the rights to Blackacre’s groundwater should be in the
hands of Kendra.242 In a Coasean “zero-transaction-cost world,” we would
be assured that this optimal allocation of property rights would ultimately be
achieved regardless of the initial allotment.243 But, as Smith has noted, this
“is not our world.”244
In a world of positive transaction and information costs, it may very well
be the case that if the water rights were initially granted to Juliette, a bargain
between the two would never be struck. Whether this occurs because the two

238. Simon Douglas & Ben McFarlane, Defining Property Rights, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAW, supra note 117, at 219, 224 (emphasis added).
239. Henry E. Smith, Emergent Property, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY
LAW, supra note 117, at 320, 336 (“Large numbers of far-flung and impersonal duty bearers cannot
be expected to keep track of large amounts of idiosyncratic information.”).
240. Smith, supra note 26, at 1691, 1704. With zero transaction costs, the initial allocation of
property is irrelevant; the optimal allocation of property rights will always be reached. See generally
R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 7 (1960).
241. A skate park is “an outdoor area having structures and surfaces for roller-skating and
skateboarding.”
Skate
Park,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/skate%20park (last visited Dec. 19, 2020). For our purposes, assume that
the skate park has not, does not, and will not use any groundwater.
242. If the rights to Blackacre’s groundwater were not in Kendra’s hands, the water would
remain unutilized by Juliette, ensuring suboptimal consequences such as: (i) Kendra would have to
spend more money securing access to other sources water, rendering the tomatoes more expensive
for Juliette to purchase; or (ii) the tomatoes would be an unprofitable/untenable crop for Kendra to
grow at all, leading to the loss of enjoyment by both Kendra and Juliette.
243. Smith, supra note 26, at 1704.
244. Id.
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do not ever talk or because hiring a lawyer to draft the needed contract would
be too expensive, the result would be suboptimal.
Thus, the initial allocation of these usage rights is of crucial importance.
Of course, an omniscient administrator of property rights would have granted
Blackacre’s surface rights to Juliette and Blackacre’s water rights to Kendra
from the very beginning, but such an administrator does not exist. Nor do
we live in the impracticable world described above where everyone receives
notice of everyone else’s in rem property rights to be able to bargain for
optimal allocation. What, then, is a viable mechanism for property to initially
allocate usage rights in a “roughly cost-effective way”?245
Because there is no omniscient administrator, property relies on the
“shortcut” of exclusion to initially allocate usage rights.246 Exclusion is a
shortcut because it allows “many uses to be protected (indirectly) without the
need to spell out most uses individually.”247 It may not always achieve the
optimal result (e.g., Juliette’s ownership of Blackacre’s groundwater), but it
is a practicable second-best.248 Exclusion as a legal shortcut may seem “nasty
and selfish, but whether it is efficient, fair, just, or virtue-promoting is
sometimes only assessable in the context of the system as a whole.”249
According to Smith, delineating property rights through exclusion is in
fact the process from which the “architecture of property emerges.”250
Counterintuitively, the rights that emerge as a result of this “property
process” may resemble those described by BOR.251 Unlike BOR’s bundles,
however, which are merely descriptive of the end result, the process by which
these rights emerge is generative252 and the reason for their internal structure
245. Id.; see also Smith, supra note 239, at 330 (noting that exclusion is not an interest, but rather
“[o]ur interest in dealing with things is in using them”); Smith, supra note 26, at 1705 (noting that
property relies on “a use-neutral exclusion strategy, and then refinement through contracts,
regulations, common law doctrine, and norms. Exclusion is at the core of this architecture because
it is a default . . . . [E]xclusion is a rough first cut—and only that—at serving the purposes of
property” (footnote omitted)).
246. Smith, supra note 26, at 1704 (noting that exclusion is a “shortcut over direct delineation
of [a] more ‘complete’ [i.e., extensional] set of legal relations”).
247. Smith, supra note 239, at 324 (noting also that “only in especially important contexts does
the law focus in on particular uses, through ‘off-the-shelf’ law (e.g., nuisance, zoning) or parties’
contracting”).
248. Smith, supra note 26, at 1704 (“Rights to exclude are a means to an end, and the ends in
property relate to people’s interests in using things.”).
249. Id. at 1718. “For example, the law of trespass “in its individual applications can look very
arbitrary, unfair, and even irrational, but it permits owners the space . . . to pursue projects without
having to answer to others, thus generally promoting efficiency and liberty.” Id.
250. Id. at 1704; see also Smith, supra note 239, at 330.
251. Marinotti, supra note 221 (manuscript at 46).
252. Henry E. Smith, On the Economy of Concepts in Property, U. PA. L. REV. 2097, 2108
(2012) (“[C]oncepts of law should not only generate the desired results but also reflect a general
theory of the system. Cognitive science hypothesizes that shortness of description in an agreed
upon meta-language corresponds to genuine generalizability.”).
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is explanatory.253 Exclusion, however, does require defining the asset from
which others are excluded. In other words, exclusion only works as a shortcut
if the bounds of the exclusion are clearly delimited. This is where property
leverages the concept of salience and our “robust and automatic prelegal
intuitions” to sufficiently delineate the things in question.254
More generally, the salience of boundaries stems from shared social
customs and intuitions. These can be grounded in subconscious cognitive
processes or learned associations, whether social, economic, or otherwise.
Tangible property, for example, relies heavily on the salience of physical
boundaries generated through deep-seeded perceptual biases.255 Even in
infancy, we show a propensity to categorize and assign discrete identities to
“solid objects” when they are “cohesive, bounded, spatiotemporally
continuous, and solid or substantial.”256 The cognitive salience of tangible
boundaries is demonstrated by the fact that even infants “conceptualize solid

253. For a New Private Law-inspired Hohfeldian formulation of property rights, see generally
Douglas & McFarlane, supra note 238. Douglas and McFarlane conclude that emergent property
rights entail a Hohfeldian liberty right to use and a Hohfeldian claim of right to exclude. See id. at
224, 226 (“[W]hen an owner claims that he has a ‘right to use’ his thing . . . he is asserting that he
himself is permitted to behave in a certain way . . . . [W]hen A claims that he has a ‘right to use’
his thing, he is asserting that he is under no legal duty to B, C, D . . . etc. not to use his thing and, in
the absence of such a duty, his use is permitted. When an owner asserts a ‘right’ in this sense, the
better word is ‘privilege’ or [Hohfeldian] ‘liberty’ . . . . The ‘right to exclude’, as a claim-right
prima facie binding on the rest of the world, correlates to duties owed by the rest of the world to
[the owner]. . . . It is the law of torts, therefore, which recognizes that the holder of a clear property
right in a thing is owed a legal duty by all others not to physically interfere with the thing.”).
254. Merrill & Smith, supra note 100, at 1894. For property law’s possible connections to
evolutionary biology, see, e.g., Jeffrey Evans Stake, The Property Instinct, 359 PHIL.
TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y LONDON: BIOLOGICAL SCIS. 1763, 1763 (2004) (“In denying the
importance of the relationship between the person and his things, however, this professional
[legal/BOR] view obscures the possibility that the institution of property rests in part on deep-seated
connections to and attitudes toward things.”); BART J. WILSON, The Meaning of Property in Things,
in THE PROPERTY SPECIES: MINE, YOURS, AND THE HUMAN MIND (2020) (arguing that property
has an evolutionary—and therefore instinctual and prelegal—foundation).
255. Note that as used here, bias is not normatively negative. Rather perceptual biases are
commonly analyzed as “simple heuristics in complex, unfamiliar, uncertain, and/or timeconstrained situations because we can only process a limited amount of the available information.”
Johan E. Korteling, Anne-Marie Brouwer & Alexander Toet, A Neural Network Framework for
Cognitive
Bias,
FRONTIERS
IN
PSYCH.
2
(Sept.
3,
2018),
https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01561/full (describing the standard
“cognitive-psychological” perspective on cognitive and perceptual biases).
256. Nancy N. Soja, Susan Carey & Elizabeth S. Spelke, Ontological Categories Guide Young
Children’s Inductions of Word Meaning: Object Terms and Substance Terms, 38 COGNITION 179,
183 (1991) (noting that solid objects “move as connected wholes, independently of one another, on
connected paths though unoccupied space”).
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objects in a way that distinguishes them from non-solid substances”257 and
assign value to distinct objects more quickly than to indiscrete substances.258
In this way, the property system functions in a world of positive
information and transaction costs by first relying on salience to “define what
a thing is in the first place” and then relying on an exclusion strategy as a
rough shortcut to grant usage rights to these defined things.259
James Penner’s famous parking lot example illustrates this shortcut in
action.260 Imagine Ana strolling through a parking lot. She walks past a car
and, perhaps subconsciously, delineates the boundaries of the car. In this
case, delineation is simple because of the perceptual salience of the car’s
tangible boundaries. Ana does not know whether the car is owned by Carlos,
is on loan to Carlos’s friend, or whether the car has just been sold to Carlos’s
coworker. Ana, however, does know two things: (1) the boundary between
the outside world and the car; and (2) that Ana herself does not own the car.
From these simple facts, Ana (i.e., the non-owner) acknowledges and upholds
her duty to not interfere with the car (e.g., by wrecking it or taking it).261
It is perhaps too obvious to state, but the bounds of the car are necessary
so that Ana can determine where she may and may not encroach. The car’s
very thinghood conveys the content and boundaries of each individual’s
rights and duties, effectively and efficiently communicating the in rem nature
of property rights.262 Thinghood avoids increasing the information cost of a

257. Id.
258. Lance J. Rips & Susan J. Hespos, Concepts of Objects and Substances in Language, 26
PSYCHONOMIC BULL. & REV. 1238, 1240–41 (2019).
259. Smith, supra note 26, at 1725 (emphasis added). But see João Marinotti, Tangibility as
Technology, 37 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 671, 703 (noting that although an intensional approach to
property law requires clear boundaries, “tangibility is only one manner of delineating boundaries;
it is not the only manner”) (first emphasis added). Salient shared social customs or intuitions may
be equally useful in delineating property boundaries. Id. at 709.
260. JAMES E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 75–76 (1997) (“As I walk through a
car park, my actual, practical duty is only capable of being understood as a duty which applies to
the cars there, not to a series of owners. . . . The content of my duty not to interfere is not structured
in any way by the actual ownership relation of the cars’ owners to their specific cars. . . . Thus
transactions between an owner and a specific other do not change the duties of everyone else not to
interfere with the property.”).
261. Carol M. Rose, Psychologies of Property (and Why Property is Not a Hawk/Dove Game),
in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAW, supra note 117, at 272, 283 (“[M]ost nonowners are not larcenists, and they do not like larcenists. . . . [Y]ou do not have to guard your things
all the time, because the ‘world’ of non-owners respects your ownership.”).
262. See Smith, supra note 239, at 324 (“If A has property in [the car], a cost-effective intension
would require the in rem aspect of property to specify the duty bearers largely at one stroke, and
would rely on the definition of a thing to deal with many resource features at once. . . . Actual
property delineation in terms of things and exclusion is a huge short cut over the fully articulated
stick-by-stick method of elimination and many less economic intermediate versions as well. Same
extension, vastly different intension.”). For a new private law-inspired Hohfeldian analysis of
property rights, see Douglas & McFarlane, supra note 238.
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property system by taking advantage of the information already present in
our cognition and in society. In fact, property law and the concept of
thinghood may rely on external information in the form of moral intuitions,263
social norms,264 and physical facts.265 These various sources of information
render the boundary of in rem property rights easily discernable by both
owners and non-owners, without increasing information costs.
It is by relying on salience and thinghood that property law may escape
circularity. By fulfilling Merrill’s three requisites of private law, the
institution of property may be derived from extralegal sources, shielding it
from government or judicial control. Property law must align with, or
reinforce, shared social customs or intuitions because its very contents are
informed by these same shared social customs or intuitions. Property law
evolves iteratively as society’s shared social customs gradually change to
address societal and technological advancements. And finally, property law
“enjoy[s] a high degree of consensus about its content”266 because without
such consensus, high information costs would render it a dysfunctional
foundation for the rest of private law.
1. The Fourth Amendment’s Reliance on the Hubs and Spokes of
Property
This Article could simply conclude that because the New Private Law’s
vision of property relies on extralegal facts, such conceptualization avoids
circularity. But the reality is not that simple. While it is true that underlying
cognitive principles may be outside the influence of government action, the
same is not true of economic or social customs. This is cause for concern if
it reopens the door to circularity. As noted above, problematic circularity in
the Fourth Amendment context extends to attitudinal circularity: “[T]he
content of the doctrine would still depend on the content of the doctrine, just
with the additional step of popular expectations [of privacy] being influenced
263. Merrill & Smith, supra note 100, at 1890–91 (“Simple and robust everyday moral intuitions
provide crucial support for the core of property—the right to exclude from a thing, good against the
world.”).
264. Ori Friedman & Karen R. Neary, First Possession Beyond the Law: Adults’ and Young
Children’s Intuitions About Ownership, 83 TUL. L. REV. 679, 684 (2009) (“[F]our- and five-yearolds’ intuitions about property disputes may be consistent with those of adults and also consistent
with basic principles of property law. The children’s preference for the first possessor over the
initial pursuer is striking because it seems unlikely that children were explicitly taught how to settle
such property disputes.”).
265. Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Personal Curtilage: Fourth Amendment Security in Public, 55
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1283, 1314 (2014) (“Property law established physical boundaries, so that
one property could be distinguished from another.”).
266. Merrill, supra note 69, at 578 (“These features also explain why private law tends to be
anchored in history, whether through custom, settled precedent, or the jus commune derived from
Roman law.”).
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by, and in turn influencing, doctrine.”267 Similarly, if the content of property
rights ultimately and solely depends on doctrine, just with the additional step
of social custom “being influenced by, and in turn influencing, doctrine,”268
property law would be just as circular.
The question, then, is whether (or when) property doctrine and social
customs are vulnerable to government manipulation. In spite of the daunting
nature of this question, New Private Law research is beginning to address this
topic through the use of complex systems theory.269 This research aims to
understand the connection between underlying social and doctrinal
conditions and the emergent system of private law as a whole.270 While this
research is still in its infancy, what is known is that the aspects of property
law “that are highly interconnected with the rest of the system” are more
entrenched and therefore riskier and more “difficult to change.”271 The “fear
of unintended consequences” holds judges and legislators from manipulating
such core interconnected elements of property law.272 To illustrate this point,
Yun-chien Chang and Smith expand on the highly interconnected concept of
possession:
[P]ossession is a fundamental concept and lawmakers worry that
changes
in
definition
may
bring
unintended
consequences. . . . Aspects of possession intersect with bailment
and with agency, security interests, and the like. A change in the
definition of possession might have implications throughout
property law, which might require adjustment in those areas.273
Unlike possession, however, isolated property doctrines (e.g., “features
of co-ownership such as sale, partition, and condominium”) may be more
easily targeted by a judge or legislator and subjected to policy manipulation

267. Kugler & Strahilevitz, supra note 21, at 1753.
268. Id.
269. See generally Smith, supra note 115. Especially in the context of evolving technologies,
the role of private law is complicated. On the one hand, private law generally adopts existing social
customs, but if consensus does not yet exist, private law may help establish new customs. In this
latter “mode,” private law would potentially be as circular as BOR. Distinguishing between the
adopting and creating modes of private law warrants further research.
270. Id. at 151 (“Systems theory can be used to help develop rules of thumb for pushing
evolution [of private law] in certain directions. To begin with, change will be easier to accomplish
for those aspects of the system that are less interconnected. . . . [M]ajor changes will be riskier the
more they touch on highly connected parts of the system. Complex systems are not immune to
reform, but we could be clearer about when and how much we should worry about unintended
effects.” (footnote omitted)).
271. Yun-chien Chang & Henry E. Smith, Convergence and Divergence in Systems of Property
Law: Theoretical and Empirical Analyses, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 785, 789 (2019).
272. Id. at 795.
273. Id. at 801–02.
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without fear of unintended consequences.274 As such, isolated doctrines are
much more susceptible to governmental policy decisions.275
The crucial distinction is between central interconnected doctrines of
property law and isolated ones. This distinction can be visualized as the hubs
and spokes of a wheel: Central interconnected doctrines are hubs that
influence a high number of other doctrines while isolated doctrines are
spokes that cite to hub doctrines but are not themselves relied upon by other
property doctrines.
Perhaps, then, Justice Scalia’s analysis that the “Fourth Amendment’s
property-rights baseline” is helpful because it “keeps easy cases easy” should
be reframed.276 Rather than distinguishing between easy and hard cases, the
law should distinguish between cases that rely on property’s interconnected
doctrines and those that rely on isolated ones.
In practice, however, property doctrines are not binarily categorized.
Rather, doctrines in a complex system lie on a spectrum between
interconnected and isolated. Thankfully, the nuances of the rule against
perpetuities, or any other isolated doctrine, are rarely the crux of a Fourth
Amendment question. In United States v. Jones,277 for example, Justice
Scalia relied on questions of possession and trespass—some of the most
central of property doctrines278—to render a Fourth Amendment decision.279
He noted that the government “trespassorily inserted the informationgathering device,” a GPS tracker, into Jones’s Jeep while it was in his
possession.280 It was by “physically occupy[ing] private property for the
purpose of obtaining information” that the police had violated the Fourth
Amendment.281
In Byrd v. United States,282 the Court relied on the core property “right
to exclude” and the concept of possession in determining that “a driver has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in a rental car [even] when he or she is not
listed as an authorized driver on the rental agreement.”283 In Rakas v.

274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.

Id. at 808.
Id. at 789 (e.g., “the contractual aspects of leases”).
Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 11 (2013).
565 U.S. 400 (2012).
Chang & Smith, supra note 271, at 801–02.
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404–05 (2012).
Id. at 410.
Id. at 404; see also Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Smart Fourth Amendment, 102
CORNELL L. REV. 547, 572 (2016) (“Justice Scalia reiterated the importance of the term ‘effect’ and
its close association with the protection of private property” when deciding Jones).
282. 138 S. Ct. 1518 (2018).
283. Id. at 1523–24; see also id. at 1527 (“The two concepts in cases like this one are often
linked. ‘One of the main rights attaching to property is the right to exclude others,’ and, in the main,
‘one who owns or lawfully possesses or controls property will in all likelihood have a legitimate
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Illinois,284 a case similar to Byrd but instead involving a passenger rather than
a driver, the Court again found that core property law doctrines were
dispositive; the defendants had “asserted neither a property nor a possessory
interest in the automobile,” so no Fourth Amendment violation occurred.285
Ultimately, these questions relied on the concepts of thinghood,
possession, and the right to exclude, which are some of the most
interconnected of the core property doctrines. It is in these cases that property
law can indeed serve as a solution to circularity. These are cases that rely on
property’s unquestionable core. Such an analysis of property and circularity
is even helpful when the Court engages with emerging technologies as the
following Section demonstrates.
2. Emerging Technology & Emergent Law
As Justice Scalia noted, “[i]t would be foolish to contend that the degree
of privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely
unaffected by the advance of technology.”286 This is not the first time that
Justices on the Supreme Court have discussed the relationship between
emerging technologies, privacy, and the Fourth Amendment.
Notably, in 1928, Justice Brandeis urged courts to “protect our liberties
as technology advances” by ensuring that “every unjustifiable intrusion by
the Government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means
employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.”287 Justice
Brandeis’s words were unfortunately not heeded and, nearly a century later,
we have yet to adopt a coherent approach to future-proof the Fourth
Amendment in the face of a digital revolution.288 This is an increasingly
pressing problem as the “[t]echnology now exists that can support mass DNA
expectation of privacy by virtue of the right to exclude.’ This general property-based concept guides
resolution of this case.” (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 144 n.12 (1978)).
284. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
285. Id. at 148.
286. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33–34 (2001) (“The question we confront today is what
limits there are upon this power of technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy.”).
287. Kerr, supra note 80, at 804 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (emphasis added)). Kerr noted that the “popular” view that the “Fourth
Amendment should be interpreted broadly in response to technological change has been embraced
by leading theorists of law and technology such as Lawrence Lessig, leading constitutional law
figures such as Laurence Tribe, and nearly everyone else who has written on the intersection of
technology and criminal procedure.” Id. (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted).
288. Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Founders’ Privacy: The Fourth Amendment and the Power of
Technological Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1325, 1325 (2001) (“With respect to the Fourth
Amendment since the invention of the telephone, judges and scholars have debated over how to
translate a document originally adopted with the investigative tools of the eighteenth century in
mind to the current state of the art.”); see also Kerr, supra note 80, at 888 (“New technologies may
reveal the limits of the modern enterprise of constitutional criminal procedure,” including the Fourth
Amendment.).
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testing, biometric scanning, and physical implants that can continuously
monitor persons and objects.”289 In spite of this reality, it is nonetheless the
“traditional responsibility” of courts to vigilantly hold the government
accountable for abuses regardless of the technology used.290
In tackling this problem, the Court has come to acknowledge that
“digital is different”291—that “new technologies will not be controlled by
analog legal precedents.”292 But that does not mean that the Fourth
Amendment’s problem of circularity has vanished, nor does it mean that
property law is irrelevant as a potential solution. As the following cases
demonstrate, emerging technologies will continue to engender Fourth
Amendment questions in which property law may successfully allow the
Court to avoid circularity. In Kyllo v. United States, 293 the Court confronted
police use of a thermal imager. The device detected infrared radiation, which,
by sensing a particular type of heat emanating from Kyllo’s home, allowed
the police to conclude that Kyllo was growing marijuana.294
Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia concluded that because the police
explored “details of the home that would previously have been unknowable
without physical intrusion,” i.e., trespass in violation of the owner’s right to
exclude, “the surveillance [was] a ‘search’ and [was] presumptively

289. Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment as a Collective Right, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV.
255, 274 (2010).
290. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 15 (1968) (“Under our decision, courts still retain their traditional
responsibility to guard against police conduct which is overbearing or harassing, or which trenches
upon personal security without the objective evidentiary justification which the Constitution
requires. When such conduct is identified, it must be condemned by the judiciary and its fruits must
be excluded from evidence in criminal trials.”); see also Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635
(1886) (“It is the duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against
any stealthy encroachments thereon.”).
291. Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Future-Proofing the Fourth Amendment, HARV. L. REV. BLOG
(Jun. 25, 2018), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/future-proofing-the-fourth-amendment/; see
also Andy Greenberg, Why the Supreme Court May Finally Protect Your Privacy in the Cloud,
WIRED (June 26, 2014, 11:13 AM), https://www.wired.com/2014/06/why-the-supreme-court-mayfinally-protect-your-privacy-in-the-cloud/.
292. Ferguson, supra note 291 (“[T]he Carpenter majority resisted a ‘mechanical interpretation
of the Fourth Amendment’ insisting that the ‘new,’ ‘novel,’ ‘unique,’ ‘seismic’ change in
technologies warrants a different outcome. This recognition of digital transformation signals a new
openness to ensure that the Fourth Amendment protects the digital lives of citizens.”).
293. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
294. Id. at 29–30 (2001) (“[The] thermal imager[] detect[s] infrared radiation, which virtually
all objects emit but which is not visible to the naked eye. The imager converts radiation into images
based on relative warmth—black is cool, white is hot, shades of gray connote relative
differences. . . . The scan of Kyllo’s home took only a few minutes and was performed from the
passenger seat of [the police’s] vehicle across the street . . . . The scan showed that the roof over
the garage . . . [was] relatively hot compared to the rest of the home and substantially warmer than
neighboring homes . . . . [The police] concluded that petitioner was using halide lights to grow
marijuana in his house, which indeed he was.”).

2022]

ESCAPING CIRCULARITY

689

unreasonable without a warrant.”295 In his typical style, Justice Scalia even
noted that thermal imagers would reveal “at what hour each night the lady of
the house takes her daily sauna and bath.”296 He acknowledged that in the
past, “[v]isual surveillance was unquestionably lawful because ‘the eye
cannot by the laws of England be guilty of a trespass,’” but noted that Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence has since significantly evolved, especially in light
of emerging technologies.297 Despite the complex technologies and evolving
jurisprudence, the Court turned to the core interconnected doctrines of
property law.
Similarly, in Jones, the Court confronted the police’s “attachment of a
Global–Positioning–System (GPS) tracking device to an individual’s
vehicle, and subsequent use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s
movements on public streets.”298 Here too, the issues raised by emerging
technologies were solved by core property questions. As noted above, the
Court found that the government “trespassorily inserted” the GPS tracking
device into Jones’s car while it was in his possession.299 It was by “physically
occupy[ing] private property for the purpose of obtaining information” that
the police violated the Fourth Amendment.300
These cases demonstrate that although emerging technologies may
continue to raise Fourth Amendment questions of first impression, property
law will continue to play a role in the Court’s analyses. Consequently, even
in such cases, a coherent, non-circular approach to property law should be
adopted.
It is noteworthy, however, that the increasingly ubiquitous
“smartphones, fitness trackers, enchanted pill bottles, smart cars, and even
smart refrigerators” currently in use already grant the government the ability
to track “personal information, patterns, and activities” by merely accessing
digital information online.301 To determine our Fourth Amendment
protections in the context of our growing data trails and in the context of the
government’s digital surveillance operations, then, the questions of relevance
include:
[I]s the data trail from an implanted “smart” heart monitor
protected as part of the “person” as understood in the Fourth
Amendment? Is the engine data emitting from a smart car
295. Id. at 40 (emphasis added).
296. Id. at 38.
297. Id. at 31–32 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 628 (1886)).
298. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 402 (2012).
299. Id. at 410.
300. Id. at 404 (emphasis added); see also Ferguson, supra note 281, at 572 (“Justice Scalia
reiterated the importance of the term ‘effect’ and its close association with the protection of private
property” when deciding Jones).
301. Ferguson, supra note 281, at 548.
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analytically distinct from the “effect” that is the car? Is a digital
business record any different from the physical document that
might otherwise fall under the “papers” protection of the Fourth
Amendment?302
Because data is not (yet) generally accepted as a form of property in the
United States,303 a static “blind application” of precedent will “not offer much
Fourth Amendment protection.”304 In Carpenter v. United States,305 the
Court ran directly into this concern when the government accessed “historical
cell phone records [i.e., data] that provide a comprehensive chronicle of the
user’s past movements.”306 Ferguson summarized the Court’s property-lawless analysis:

302. Id. at 550.
303. It is noteworthy that while a few courts have treated data and non-rival electronic documents
as property for the purposes of conversion, there is significant disagreement among courts and
commentators. See, e.g., Thyroff v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 864 N.E.2d 1272, 1278 (N.Y. 2007)
(“[E]lectronic documents . . . can also be converted by simply pressing the delete button.”);
Integrated Direct Mktg., LLC v. May, 495 S.W.3d 73, 76 (Ark. 2016). But see Epic Sys. Corp. v.
Tata Consultancy Servs. Ltd., No. 14-cv-748-wmc, 2016 WL 4033276, at *27 (W.D. Wisc. July 27,
2016) (“[T]here is, at least so far, no support from Wisconsin courts for such an expansion of this
state’s common law [to recognize conversion claims of electronic data].”); Wells v. Chattanooga
Bakery, Inc., 448 S.W.3d 381, 392 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2014). Some commentators believe that many
more forms of data deserve property protections (as distinct from IP protections). See, e.g.,
Lawrence Lessig, The Architecture of Privacy, 1 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 56, 63 (1999)
(“Information is an asset. . . . So the trick is to construct a regime where those who would use the
data internalize this cost, by paying those whose data are used. The laws of property are one such
regime.”); see also Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV.
2056, 2125 (2004) (concluding that a “strong conception of personal data as a commodity is
emerging in the United States”). But others fear the inherent dangers and conceptual hurdles of
creating or finding property rights in data. See Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual
Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1129, 1142 (2000) (“A property rights model for protecting
personal data nevertheless presents many problems. . . . [Specifically, it presents problems] to those
who consider information privacy to be a fundamental civil right.”). Note, too, that certain scholarly
attempts at granting property rights over non-rival digital assets do so by first converting them into
rival assets. See, e.g., Jeffrey Ritter & Anna Mayer, Regulating Data as Property: A New Construct
for Moving Forward, 16 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 220, 263 (2018) (suggesting that “[w]hile
conventional discussions suggest data files can be duplicated, when properly enveloped or
associated with related metadata and provenance, and bundled by suitable encryption or other
controls, any data file can, in fact, be unique and incapable of perfect duplication”). The sheer
number of competing viewpoints among courts and academics demonstrates that resource
management of non-rival digital assets deserves significant attention. The question, though, is not
whether such resources require an efficient management regime (they do); but rather, the question
is whether data fits within the property law framework, including its doctrines, underlying policies,
and emergent effects. Given the current scope of disagreement, it is unlikely that the Fourth
Amendment will be applied to data through the lens of property law at any time in the foreseeable
future.
304. Ferguson, supra note 281, at 574.
305. 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
306. Id. at 2211 (“Each time the phone connects to a cell site, it generates a time-stamped record
known as cell-site location information (CSLI).”).
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Courts are to ask whether individuals have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in personal data held by third
parties. . . . [T]he Carpenter Court found a sufficient reasonable
expectation of privacy in cell phone consumers’ location data to
warrant Fourth Amendment protection. . . . [A] digital-Katz test
emphasizes the importance of examining the specific technology
at issue. In the cell-phone case, the Court seemed persuaded
that . . . on balance this particular . . . technology violated an
expectation of privacy.307
Note that this digital-Katz test suffers from the same circularity concerns
as the analog one. Its reliance on a reasonable expectation of privacy test
raises the very same circular analyses. The Court, however, declined to
address this known issue. Even Justice Scalia realized that for cases
involving purely digital surveillance or “[s]ituations involving merely the
transmission of electronic signals without trespass,” the Court would have
nothing but the “Katz analysis” to rely on.308 In these cases, property law
may not be able to help the Court avoid circularity in the same way, but that
does not mean we should succumb to a “doctrinally circular, or
tautological,”309 and consequently “subjective and unpredictable” Fourth
Amendment.310 It does mean, however, that more work is necessary.311
Although a thorough analysis of digital criminal procedure is outside
the scope of this Article, it is all but certain that criminal investigations will
continue to rely on physical objects, at least insofar as the ones and zeros of
digital information must still be stored and processed in a physical medium.
Even without determining whether data is property, courts will undoubtably
continue to apply property concepts in their analysis of whether hacking and
other forms of digital surveillance violate property law and therefore trigger
Fourth Amendment protections.312 Thus, insofar as criminal investigations
307. Ferguson, supra note 291.
308. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 411 (2012).
309. Kahn-Fogel, supra note 32, at 103 (footnote omitted).
310. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
311. Unfortunately, though, “[j]udicial decisions tend to incorporate outdated assumptions of
technological practice, leading to rules that make little sense in the present or future.” Kerr, supra
note 80, at 807. Therefore, a comprehensive approach involving judges, policymakers, and
academics may prove to be a better path than a passive reliance on case-by-case evolution for the
Fourth Amendment in the context of digital surveillance. But this, certainly, is beyond the scope of
this Article.
312. See e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Does 1–2, No.1:16-cv-993 (GBL/TCB), 2016 WL 9334654, at
*1 (E.D. Va. Aug. 12, 2016) (order granting preliminary injunction) (“There is good cause to believe
that Defendants [botnet hackers] have engaged in and are likely to engage in acts or practices
that . . . constitute trespass to chattels, unjust enrichment and conversion . . . .”); Tom Burt, New
Action to Combat Ransomware Ahead of U.S. Elections, MICROSOFT ON THE ISSUES (Oct. 12,
2020), https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2020/10/12/trickbot-ransomware-cyberthreat-uselections/.
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will continue to rely on physical objects, they will continue to raise questions
of property law. When they do, the New Private Law property framework
may offer a better guide to avoid circularity, decrease subjectivity, and
increase predictability.
CONCLUSION
Property law is commonly promulgated as a solution to the Fourth
Amendment’s circularity problem. Concealed in this analytical move is an
assumption that property law is not, itself, circular. The commonly cited
bundle-of-rights conceptualization of property, however, is circular and
smuggles with it the very same “problem”313 that renders the Fourth
Amendment “subjective and unpredictable.”314 In exploring this problem,
this Article adopted the perspectives and concerns of Justices Scalia, Thomas,
Kennedy, and Gorsuch, among others, to highlight the incompatibility of the
Court’s current approach toward property law in the Fourth Amendment.
Thus, without determining whether Katz is indeed circular, whether
circularity is itself a problem, or whether property norms should define
privacy rights, this Article analyzed the coherence of property law’s assumed
role in the Fourth Amendment.
This Article concludes that in spite of the metaphor’s near ubiquity, the
bundle-of-rights conceptualization of property is neither a sufficiently robust
theory nor is it faithfully applied by the courts. Ultimately, the bundle’s
reliance on an extensional descriptive theory of property renders it impotent
against circularity and fails to provide determinate answers in the Fourth
Amendment context. Instead, an intensional approach to the private law of
property more closely aligns with the behavior of courts and provides a more
coherent way to avoid circularity. By incorporating findings from cognitive
science, sociology, and complex systems theory, the New Private Law
research framework demonstrates how core interconnected doctrines of
property law are emergent and largely insulated from judicial and legislative
manipulation. The interconnected nature of property law means that small
changes to its foundations could have cascading economic and social effects
across the legal system. Thus, judges and legislators across the world avoid
manipulating these foundational concepts of property law for fear of
unintended consequences, as recent empirical evidence has shown.315 In this
way, property law’s foundational doctrines are indeed insulated and can
serve as a solution to circularity in the Fourth Amendment context. An
unintended benefit of this approach is that it also generates a prescriptive
313. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2245 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
314. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.
315. See generally Chang & Smith, supra note 271.
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definition of property rights, enabling property law to provide more
determinate answers to both current and future Fourth Amendment questions.
More broadly, this approach may also enable a coherent means to address the
role of property law in other public constitutional law contexts.
Such solutions, however, require that judges and legislators
acknowledge the deficiencies of the realist bundle-of-rights approach to
property law. In so doing, they would pave the way for a more robust,
nuanced, and intensional definition of property. It is only through this
intensional approach that property law can avoid circularity, decrease
subjectivity, and increase predictability in both private and public law.

